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COMMENTS
Commercial Transactions: Waiver of Guarantor's Rights
in Mortgage Transactions Under Oklahoma Law
Introduction
Banks and other lending institutions, as a condition to making a loan or otherwise
extending credit to a debtor, often demand an obligation by a third party to pay the
debt as additional security for the debtor's performance.' In the mortgage lending
situation, this third-party obligation is generally created through a contract of
guaranty between the creditor and the third party, who is called the guarantor. A
guaranty is generally defined as a promise to pay the debt of another in case the
other person fails to pay? The status of guarantor gives the party guaranteeing
payment rights against the principal debtor. If the creditor requests payment from the
guarantor, the guarantor can force the debtor to satisfy the obligation under the
guarantor's right of exoneration. In addition, if the guarantor is ultimately required
to pay the debtor's obligation, the guarantor is entitled to be reimbursed by the debtor
and also succeeds to the creditor's rights through the guarantor's right of
subrogation.3 Thus, a guaranty creates a three-party relationship between the
guarantor, debtor, and creditor. Essentially, the debtor is liable to the creditor on the
principal debt; the guarantor is liable to the creditor on the guaranty contract; and if
the creditor requests payment from the guarantor, the guarantor has the right to
require the debtor to pay and the right to reimbursement from the debtor for any
payment the guarantor makes to the creditor.
Because of this special "tripartite relationship,"4 Oklahoma has adopted statutes
to protect the guarantor from liability for the debtor's obligation in certain situations.
For example, the obligation of the guarantor cannot be larger in amount or more
burdensome than that of the principal debtor Also, the acceptance by the creditor
of anything in partial satisfaction reduces the obligation of the guarantor in the same
amount as that of the principal.6 These two rules recognize the derivative liability
of the guarantor. In addition, a guarantor is generally discharged by any act of the
creditor which alters the obligation of the principal debtor or which limits the
1. See John P. Roberts, Guarantor's Liability After Mortgage Foreclosure Sale: Issue Resolved, 52
OKLA. B.J. 723, 723 (1981).
2. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 321 (1991); Gravelle v. Pollock Stores Co. of Talihina, 267 P. 473, 475
(Okla. 1928).
3. See Moore v. White, 603 P.2d 1119,1121 (Okla. 1979); Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National Educators
Life Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 984, 986 (Okla. 1975).
4. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1980).
5. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 334 (1991).
6. See id. § 341.
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creditor's remedies against the principal debtor! This statute recognizes that the
contract between the guarantor and creditor is separate from the agreement between
the debtor and the creditor; and thus, the obligation of the guarantor cannot be
unilaterally changed based on the creditor's dealings with the debtor.
Because these statutes are default rules for the protection of the guarantor, a
guarantor is generally entitled to contractually waive the application of these rules.8
Allowing waiver of these rules sometimes seems troubling, however, especially when
the guarantor is allowed to waive a defense to payment when the debtor itself would
not be entitled to waive that defense for public policy reasons. For example,
Oklahoma courts have allowed guarantors to waive any defenses they might have to
paying a deficiency judgment after foreclosure based on Oklahoma's anti-deficiency
statute,9 even though the debtor would not be allowed to waive the protection of the
anti-deficiency statute." The problem thus created is whether the guarantor is
entitled to reimbursement when it waives a defense that the debtor would not be
entitled to waive.
Generally, this omment considers when, under Oklahoma law, a guarantor of a
mortgage loan is entitled to waive defenses it might have against paying the debt of
the principal debtor and whether there are situations in which such a guarantor should
not be entitled to waive certain defenses to payment. This comment first considers
Oklahoma law dealing with how guarantees are created in mortgage transactions and
the nature of such guarantees. Part II of this comment considers Oklahoma law
concerning the ability of a guarantor to waive its statutory defenses and the effect of
such waiver on the guarantor's ability to get reimbursement from the principal debtor.
This part of the comment places special emphasis on Oklahoma cases dealing with
the Oklahoma anti-deficiency statute. Part I of this comment analyzes Oklahoma's
approach to allowing guarantors to waive defenses in light of the approach of other
states and the recently promulgated Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty.
Lastly, part IV of this comment considers Oklahoma's approach of allowing waiver
of any protection under Oklahoma's anti-deficiency statutes.
L Guaranties in Mortgage Transactions Under Oklahoma Law
A. Creation of Guaranties in Mortgage Transactions
Under Oklahoma law a guaranty is "a promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another person."" A guaranty is created by contract between the
guarantor and the creditor. The debtor need not be, and generally is not, a party to
the guaranty agreement. 2 A contract of guaranty must generally be in writing and
7. See id. § 338; 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-605 (1991).
8. See Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Okla. 1992).
9. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 686 (1991).
10. See Founders, 830 P.2d at 1364; Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 442 (Okla.
1980).
11. 15 OKLA. STAr. § 321 (1991).
12. See Riverside, 613 P.2d at 441; see also 15 OKLA. STAT. § 322 (1991) ("A person may become




signed by the guarantor to be enforceable. 3 A guaranty executed contemporaneously
with the creation of the underlying debt obligation between the debtor and creditor,
or as a part of the same general transaction, does not require separate con-
sideration. 4 Often, the contract of guaranty is presented in the form of a unilateral
offer made at the time an extension of credit is given to the debtor."s The unilateral
offer of guaranty is not binding on the guarantor until notice of its acceptance is
communicated to the guarantor, unless the guaranty recites that it is an absolute
guaranty of payment. 6
Typically, a party can become secondarily liable for the performance of another
in a mortgage situation in two other ways. First, a person can assume secondary
liability as an accommodation party on the note evidencing the mortgage indebted-
ness. 7 A person becomes secondarily liable as an accommodation party by signing
an instrument governed by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code for the purpose
of becoming liable on the instrument without being the direct beneficiary of the value
given for the instrument." The obligation of an accommodation party may be
enforced notwithstanding any statute of frauds and whether or not the accommodation
party receives consideration for the accommodation. 9 Second, the mortgagor in a
mortgage transaction can become secondarily liable, by operation of law, if the
mortgagor transfers the mortgaged property to a party who takes the property "subject
to" the mortgage or "assumes" the mortgage debt' ° In that case, the mortgaged
property (if the transferee takes the property "subject to" the mortgage) or the
transferee (if the transferee "assumes the mortgage") are the principals and the
13. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 324 (1991).
14. See id. § 323.
15. See Joe E. Edwards, Accommodation Parties, Guarantors and Other Sureties 7, in Oklahoma City
Univ. Sch. of Law, Law of Promissory Notes (Oct. 30, 1987) (material distributed for CLE course, on
file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
16. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 326 (1991); see also Penner v. Int'l Harvester Co. of Am., 41 P.2d 843,
844 (Okla. 1935) (noting that notice of acceptance is not required if the guaranty recites that it is an
absolute guaranty of payment upon maturity).
17. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419 (1991).
18. See id. § 3-419(a).
19. See id. § 3-419(b). It should be noted that there is no requirement for additional consideration
to support the obligation of an accommodation party even when the accommodation party signs after the
instrument is delivered to the holder. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-419 U.C.C. cmt. 2 (West 1998).
20. See Sooner Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oklahoma Cent. Credit Union, 790 P.2d 526, 530 (Okla.
1989); Stalcup v. Easerly, 351 P.2d 735, 738 (Okla. 1960); Harden v. American-First Nat'l Bank, 6 P.2d
1060, 1062 (Okla. 1931); cf Smiley v. Wheeler, 602 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Okla. 1979) (holding that the
original debtor on a note secured by personal property became a surety in relation to the transferee of
the secured property who assumed the debt). See generally GRANT S. NELSoN & DALE A. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 5.3-5.4 (3d ed. 1994).
Note that the suretyship relationship between the mortgagor and transferee is only effective as between
the two of them unless the mortgagee elects to recognize such a relationship. See Rice v. Federal Life
Ins. Co., 45 P.2d 49, 51 (Okla. 1935). The mortgagee can choose to look to the original mortgagor as
primarily liable because there can be no change to the legal relationship between the mortgagor and
mortgagee without the mortgagee's knowledge and consent. See id. Courts have held that any act
evidencing an intent to hold the grantee personally liable is sufficient to change the mortgagors status
from principal to surety. See id.
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
mortgagor become:3 a surety."
While different Oklahoma statutes govern the rights and liabilities of guarantors,
accommodation parties, and sureties, each of these parties is generally referred to
as a "surety" and has the same general rights against the principal and the creditor.'
Thus, the issues concerning the waiver of these suretyship rights are generally the
same whether the party is specifically classified as a guarantor, accommodation party,
or surety. Although this paper focuses on guarantors because that is the most
common type of suretyship relationship created in mortgage transactions, this paper
compares the Oklahoma statutes governing accommodation parties and sureties when
appropriate.
B. Nature of the Guarantor's Liability
Under Oklahoma law, a guarantor has a collateral obligation which is indepen-
dently and separately enforceable from that of the principal debtor.24 Oklahoma
courts hold that the guarantor is secondarily liable; thus, the guarantor's obligation is
conditioned on the default of the principal debtor.' The guarantor's obligation is
contractual; and thus, the extent of the guarantor's obligation must be determined
from the terms of te guaranty agreement.'
Because the obligation of the guarantor is purely contractual,' contracts of
guaranty are to be construed under the rules applied to contracts generally."
Because a guaranty must be in writing under Oklahoma law," the terms of the
21. See Sooner Federal, 790 P.2d at 530; Stalcup, 351 P.2d at 738; see also NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 20, §§ 5.3-5.4.
22. See 15 OKLA STAT. §§ 321-344 (1991) (governing guarantors) (the "Oklahoma guaranty
statutes"); id. §§ 371-385 (governing sureties) (the "Oklahoma Surety Statutes"); 12A OKLA. STAT. §§
3-305(d), 3-419, 3-605 (1991) (governing accommodation parties). A surety is distinguished from a
guaranty on the grounds that a surety is typically jointly and severally liable with the principal obligor
on an obligation to which they are both bound, while a guarantor typically contracts to fulfill the
obligation of the principal only upon default. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND
GUARANTY §§ 1 cmt. c, 15 (1996). An accommodation party is distinguished from a surety and
guarantor because a person becomes an accommodation party only by signing an instrument governed
by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(a) (1991).
23. See Moore v. White, 603 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Okla. 1979) ("There exists but a technical difference
between a surety and a guarantor."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § I cmts.
c, d (1996) (recognizing that although there are differences between "sureties" and "guarantors," the rights
associated with being liable for the debt of another is the same in both cases); 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-419 U.C.C. cmt. 3 (West 1998) (stating that an accommodation party is always a surety).
24. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1980); see also 15 OKLA.
STAT. § 373 (1991) ("A surety cannot be held beyond the express terms of his contract .... "); 12A
OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(b) (1991) ("An accommodation party... is obliged to pay the instrument in the
capacity in which the accommodation party signs.").
25. See Lum v. Le Way Motor Freight, Inc., 757 P.2d 810, 814 (Okla. 1987).
26. See Riverside, 613 P.2d at 441.
27. See Lum, 757 P.2d at 815.
28. See INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brandywine Assocs., Ltd., 800 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990);
see also 15 OKLA. STAT. § 374 (1991) ("In interpreting the terms of a contract of suretyship, the same
rules are to be observed as in the case of other contracts.").




guarantor's agreement govern the extent of the obligation." The intent of the parties
at the time they entered the agreement controls the meaning of the written
agreement.31 This intent is determined from the entire writing.32 Where the
language of the guaranty contract is complete and unambiguous, the intent of the
parties must be determined from the language of the writing without resort to
extrinsic evidence. 3 If the guaranty's language is ambiguous, the court may look at
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties at the time of contracting.'
The construction of a contract of guaranty involves two steps. First, if the
language is ambiguous, the court applies the appropriate rule of construction in
construing the language of the contract. Second, after the meaning of the guaranty
contract has been determined, the obligations of the guarantor are construed based
on the appropriate rule of construction.
Oklahoma courts have consistently held that in case of ambiguity, the language of
a guaranty contract is to be construed strongly against the guarantor and in favor of
the creditor. Oklahoma's rule of construing guarantees against the guarantor is
based on the principle that a guaranty agreement should be construed in favor of the
party who parted with property in reliance on the collateral promise.3' This rule of
construction should be compared with the rule, applied in some states, that a guaranty
should be construed strictly in favor of the guarantor.37
Once the meaning of the language of the contract of guaranty is determined, the
court construes the obligations of the guarantor based on one of two possible rules.
If the contract is made by a guarantor for hire or a guarantor who has a personal
interest in the matter out of which the obligation arose, the court must construe the
obligations of the guarantor liberally and most strongly against the guarantor.8 If
the guaranty is made without compensation or without sharing in the benefits of the
principal transaction, however, the guarantor's obligations will be strictly construed
the obligation of an accommodation party, see 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(b) (1991), the obligation of
an accommodation party must be based on a writing based on the definition of an accommodation party,
see 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(a) (1991) (requiring that an accommodation party signs an "instrument");
id. § 3-104(a) (defining an "instrument" as a "promise" or "order"); id. § 3-103(a)(6), (7) (defining a
"promise" or "order" as a writing).
30. See Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Okla. 1991).
31. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (1991); Founders, 830 P.2d at 1361.
32. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 157 (1991); Founders, 830 P.2d at 1361.
33. See Founders, 830 P.2d at 1361; Lum, 757 P.2d at 815.
34. See Lum, 757 P.2d at 815.
35. See Lum, 757 P.2d at 816; see also Founders, 830 P.2d at 1362; Riverside Nat'l Bank v.
Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 442 (Okla. 1980); Rucker v. Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951, 954 (Okla.
1966); Lamm & Co. v. Colcord, 98 P. 355, 356 (Okla. 1908). But cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
B.A.S., Inc., 735 P.2d 358, 360-61 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (construing guaranty agreement against the
creditor bank which prepared the agreement).
36. See Riverside, 613 P.2d at 442; Lamm & Co., 98 P. at 356.
37. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1492 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that under Illinois law a guaranty agreement should be construed strictly in favor of the guarantor).
38. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 483 (1991); Lum, 757 P.2d at 816; Fuqua v. Tulsa Masonic Bldg., 263
P. 660, 662 (Okla. 1928); Chowning v. First State Bank, 225 P. 715, 716 (1924).
1998]
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and the guarantor will not be held beyond the precise terms of the contract?
A guarantor's liability can be structured in several different ways. For example, a
guaranty can be unconditional. Under this type of guaranty, the guarantor has the
duty to see that the obligations of the principal debtor are discharged at maturity. 40
The guarantor is liable to the creditor immediately upon default, and the creditor does
not have to give demand or notice. This type of guaranty is also called a guaranty
of payment.4' Under Oklahoma law, a guaranty is deemed unconditional unless the
terms of the guaranty contract place a condition precedent on the guarantor's
liability.
42
The guarantor can place a condition on its liability by creating what is called a
guaranty of solvency. 3 These types of guarantees are also called guarantees of
collection." Under a guaranty of solvency, the guarantor is assuring that the debtor
will be solvent and that the creditor will be able to collect the debt by the usual legal
proceedings, if taken with reasonable diligence.4 Under such a guaranty, the
guarantor is not liable unless the creditor has not been able to collect the debt
through legal proceedings or unless the debtor is insolvent.4 However, the guarantor
will become liable without action of the creditor if the debt is obviously uncollectible
from the principal debtor.47
A guarantor can create a continuing guaranty by promising to guaranty the future
liability of the d-.btor to the creditor regarding successive transactions.4' A
continuing guaranty can be revoked at any time by the guarantor with respect to
future transactions, unless there is continuing consideration as to the future
transactions.49 The guarantor's liability under a continuing guaranty will be deemed
to continue until it has been revoked unless there is an express limitation on the
guarantor's liability.-°
C. Rights of the Guarantor
1. Rights Against the Creditor
The obligation of a guarantor is based on the principal obligation of the debtor to
39. See Fuqua, 263 P. at 662; Lamm & Co., 98 P. at 356.
40. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 507 (Okla. 1993) (citing
Master v. Boyles, 145 P. 363, 365 (Okla. 1914)).
41. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(b), (d) (1991); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 332 (1991).
42. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 331 (1991); see also 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(d) (1991) (for an
accommodation party to be a guarantor of collection, the accommodation party must unambiguously
indicate that it is guaranteeing collection rather than payment).
43. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 328 (1991).
44. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(d) (1991).
45. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 328 (1991).
46. See 12A OKLA,. STAT. § 3-419(d) (1991); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 331 (1991).
47. See 12A OKL. STAT. § 3-419(d)(iv) (1991); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 332 (1991).
48. See I5 OKLA. STAT. § 336 (1991); Rucker v. Republic Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951, 953 (Okla.
1966).
49. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 337 (1991).
50. See Rucker, 415 P.2d at 953.




the creditor. The purpose of the guaranty is to assure the creditor the performance
to which it is entitled pursuant to the obligation of the debtor.' Thus, as a corollary,
the guarantor's liability is limited to the liability of the debtor. Title 15, section 334
states that "[t]he obligation of a guarantor must be neither larger in amount, nor in
other respects more burdensome than that of the principal; and if, in its terms, it
exceeds it, it is reducible in proportion to the principal obligation." In addition,
consistent with the one satisfaction rule, section 341 states that "[t]he acceptance, by
a creditor, of anything in partial satisfaction of an obligation, reduces the obligation
of a guarantor thereof, in the same measure as that of a principal, but does not
otherwise affect it." It is also generally recbgnized that a guarantor can raise against
the creditor any defense that the debtor would have against the creditor except
infancy, lack of legal capacity, and discharge in insolvency proceedings.' These
rules recognize the derivative nature of the guarantor's obligation to the creditor.
In addition to the rights the guarantor has based on the derivative nature of the
guaranty obligation, the guarantor has rights based on the fact that the guaranty
agreement is separate from the agreement between the debtor and creditor. A
guarantor enters a guaranty relationship based on a risk evaluation. The guarantor
evaluates the risk of having to pay and the risk of being unable to get reimbursement
or some other remedy from the debtor if the guarantor is required to pay.' If, after
entering the guaranty agreement based on this risk evaluation, the creditor acts in a
way that changes the guarantor's risk, the guarantor could receive unanticipated
losses.55 The law has protected the guarantor from such unanticipated loss by the
creation of what has been called the "suretyship defenses."
Oklahoma has codified the guarantor's suretyship defenses at title 15, section 338.
Section 338 states that "[a] guarantor is exonerated,['] except so far as he may be
indemnified by the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without the consent of the
guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, or the
remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in respect thereto, in any way
impaired or suspended. ' Oklahoma has codified the suretyship defenses available
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 34 cmt. a (1996).
53. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-305(d) (1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND
GUARANTY § 34(1) (1996); see also 15 OKLA. STAT. § 335 (1991) (stating that a guarantor is not liable
if the contract of the principal is unlawful unless the contract is void against the principal based on a
personal disability).
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY ch. 3, topic 3, tit. B introductory
note (1996).
55. See id
56. Exoneration is the right of a surety to compel the principal debtor to pay the creditor. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 21 cmt. i (1996). The use of "exoneration"
in section 338 and other Oklahoma statutes dealing with guaranty and suretyship seems incorrect. It
seems that the correct term in this statute is "discharge," which refers to the extinguishment of the
surety's obligation. Consistent with current terminology, this paper will use the term "discharge" to
explain the effect of the suretyship defenses. See, e.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-605 (1991); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 37 (1996).
57. This general rule discharging the guarantor is limited by the provisions of title 15, sections 339,
340, and 342-344.
19981
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to a "surety" at title 15, section 377. Section 377 states that a surety is discharged:
(1) in any manner in which a guarantor is discharged; (2) to the extent the surety is
prejudiced by an act of the creditor which impairs the surety's remedies or lessens
his security; or (3) to the extent the surety is prejudiced by an omission of the
creditor to do anything, when required by the surety, which the creditor has a duty
to do." Although not settled, a guarantor may be able to use extra protections
outlined in section :377. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that no practical
differences exist between the rights of sureties and guarantors." Section 3-605 of
the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code codifies the suretyship defenses available
to accommodation parties.
Although the Oklahoma guaranty and surety statutes are stated in general terms,
the suretyship defenses have been broken down into several categories of actions by
the creditor. Oklahoma law has recognized that the following types of actions by
creditors will constitute a suretyship defense: (1) release of the obligation of the
debtor;' (2) extension of time given to the debtor; (3) modification of the
underlying obligations; (4) impairment of collateral;' and (5) refusal of tender of
58. Section 377(3) seems to relate to the ability of the surety to the statutory right of the surety to
require the creditor to prcceed against the principal debtor to satisfy the obligation. See 15 OKLA, STAT.
§ 379 (1991). Section 379 states that if the creditor neglects to proceed against the principal as required
by the surety, the surety is discharged to the extent it is prejudiced. Section 379 essentially codifies the
doctrine of Pain v. Packt, rd, 13 Johns. 174 (N.Y. 1816) (also published at 7 Am. Dec. 369). However,
Oklahoma courts have held that an oral request that the creditor sue the principal is not enough to entitle
the surety to discharge. See Gregg v. Oklahoma State Bank, 179 P. 613, 614 (Okla. 1919); Palmer v.
Noe, 150 P. 462, 464-65 (Okla. 1915); see also Joseph M. Cormack & Neil G. McCarroll, The
Distinction Between Suretyship and Guaranty in States Having the Field Code Provisions, 10 S. CAL.
L. REv. 371,396 n.182 (1937) (discussing Oklahoma's treatment of the Pain v. Packard statute). In any
event, the courts of state. having statutes similar to Oklahoma's surety and guaranty statutes have held
that the codification of the doctrine in Pain v. Packard does not apply to guarantors. See Cormack &
McCarroll, supra, at 396 & n.132.
59. See Moore v. White, 603 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Okla. 1979).
60. See Shuttee v. Coalgate Grain Co., 172 P. 780, 782 (Okla. 1918). But see section 3-605(b) of
the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that a release of the debtor accomplished
through a discharge by cancellation or renunciation of the instrument under section 3-604 does not act
to discharge the accommodation party. However, it should be noted that if the release is not
accomplished pursuant to a discharge under section 3-604, the rights of the accommodation party would
be governed by the general kaw of surety and guarantors. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103 (1991); 12A
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 21 (West 1998).
61. See 12A OKLA. STAT. 3-605(c) (1991); Sawyer v. Bahnsen, 226 P. 344, 345 (Okla. 1924);
Kremke v. Radamaker, 159 P. 475 (Okla. 1916); Stetler v. Boling, 152 P. 452, 454 (Okla. 1915). The
court in Patty v. Price, 304 P.2d 289, 291 (Okla. 1956), when citing to Adams v. Ferguson, 147 P. 772
(Okla. 1915), recognized that the following six elements are necessary for an extension to constitute a
discharge of the surety: (1) valid consideration; (2) an agreement; (3) the extension must be for a definite
time; (4) lack of consent of the surety; (5) without reservation of remedy against the surety; and (6) the
agreement must be with the principal debtor. In relation to accommodation parties, parts of this test have
been overruled by section 3-605 because an extension can be made without consideration under section
3-605(c), and the reserv.tion of rights is no longer recognized in relation to instruments under the
Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 22 (West 1998).
62. See 15 OKLA. STA\T. § 338 (1991); 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605(d) (West 1998); Dynalectron
Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659, 663 (W.D. Okla. 1972).




performance.' Although delay in enforcement of the underlying obligation can act
as a suretyship defense, title 15, section 342 specifically states that delay by a
creditor in enforcing the underlying obligation does not discharge the guarantor.'
In addition, Oklahoma courts have held that the running of the statute of limitations
on the debtor's obligation does not act to discharge the guarantor's liability.67
In relation to a contract of guaranty, Oklahoma seems to follow a strict discharge
approach to the suretyship defenses. Under Oklahoma decisions, any material
departure from the terms of the contract of guaranty completely discharges the
guarantor.' This approach, however, can be problematic. The strict discharge
approach may result in a windfall to the guarantor when the relief provided by the
total discharge exceeds any harm caused by the creditor's actions.' A more
equitable approach is taken in section 3-605 of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial
Code. Under section 3-605, the accommodation party is only discharged to the extent
the action of the creditor causes loss to the accommodation party."0 The recently
promulgated Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty also takes the approach
that a surety or guaranty should only be discharged to the extent of loss created by
a creditor's actions.7 In addition, although the strict discharge approach used with
guarantors can be applied to sureties under section 377(1), under subsections (2)-(3)
of section 377, stating that a surety is discharged only "to the extent to which he is
prejudiced," proving loss to the surety could be required.'
Although the Oklahoma decisions have followed a strict discharge approach when
applying section 338, the language of this section could be interpreted to allow a
Wheeler, 602 P.2d 209, 212 & n. 377(2) (Okla. 1979). But see First City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol
Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that, under title 15, section 338 of
the Oklahoma Statutes, a guarantor of payment is not discharged when the creditor impairs the debtor's
collateral).
64. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 376 (1991); 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-603(b) (1991).
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 43 (1996).
66. See also Carver v. Tinker Field Employees Credit Union, 442 P.2d 342, 344 (Okla. 1968)
(holding that the delay of a creditor in foreclosing a chattel mortgage does not discharge the surety).
67. See Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National Educators Life Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 984, 986 (Okla. 1975).
68. See Rabon v. Putnam, 164 F.2d 80, 83-84 (10th Cir. 1947); Apache, 529 P.2d at 986-87;
Quapaw Pumping & Royalty Co. v. Camblin, 232 P. 84, 88 (Okla. 1924).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 37 cmt. a (1996).
70. It should be noted that section 3-605 of the Oklahoma Commercial Code establishes different
burdens of proving loss to the accommodation party depending on what action is taken by the party
entitled to enforce the instrument. If the party entitled to enforce the instrument grants an extension to
the accommodated party or impairs the value of accommodated parties' collateral, the accommodation
party is discharged to the extent that it proves loss based on the extension. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-
605(c), (e) (1991). However, if the party entitled to enforce the instrument modifies the obligation of the
accommodated party, the party entitled to enforce the instrument has the burden of proving that no loss
was created by the amount of recourse. See id. § 3-605(d). This difference of burdens can result in
problems of determining whether a discharge is appropriate in such situations where a party entitled to
enforce the instrument grants an extension and modifies that obligation of the accommodated party. See
PEB Commentary No. 11: Suretyship Issues Under Sections 3-116, 3-305, 3-415, 3-419, and 3-605, 3B
U.L.A. 120 (1993).
71. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §§ 39-44 (1996).
72. See Harden v. American-First NatI Bank, 6 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Okla. 1931).
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
guarantor to be discharged only to the extent of any loss. The language of section
338 states that a guarantor is discharged "except so far as he may be indemnified by
the principal."' Thi; language does not appear to require that a guarantor has been
indemnified for the discharge to be limited. That situation is covered by section
343.74 The language of section 338 seems to provide a limitation on the guarantor's
discharge whenever there is potential for indemnification from the principal. That
would be the case if the act of the creditor resulting in discharge did not completely
foreclose the guarantor's ability to pass the cost of performance to the debtor.
Oklahoma courts, using the term "indemnity" interchangeably with the term "reimbu-
rsement," have found an implied promise by the principal to indemnify the surety
when the surety pays the principal's obligation." This finding is consistent with
Oklahoma's indemnty statutes which require a contract of indemnity, but do not
require the contract to be in writing 6 Therefore, it seems section 338 could be
interpreted to discharge the guarantor only to the extent of any loss caused by the
creditor's actions.
2. Rights Against the Principal
As between a surety or guarantor and the principal, the principal has the duty to
perform or bear the cost of performance." Thus, the common law recognized that,
by operation of law, a surety or guarantor has recourse against the principal. The
Restatement (Third) qfSuretyship and Guaranty recognizes that a surety or guarantor
has the following types of recourse against the principal: enforcement of the
principal's duty to perform through exoneration; entitlement to reimbursement from
the principal; enforcement of the right to restitution; and subrogation to the rights of
the creditor 8
The Oklahoma surety statutes recognize a surety's right to exoneration, reimbur-
sement, and subrogation. Title 15, section 380 recognizes the surety's right of
exoneration by providing that a surety can compel the principal debtor to perform its
obligation. Section 382 recognizes the surety's right of subrogation by providing that
upon full satisfaction of the principal debtor's obligation, the surety can enforce every
remedy which the creditor then has against the principal to the extent the surety is
reimbursed for what it has expended."
Section 381 recognizes that if a surety satisfies the principal obligation, or any part
73. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 338 (1991).
74. "A guarantor, who has been indemnified by the principal, is liable to the creditor to the extent
of the indemnity ... ." 15 OKLA. STAT. § 343 (1991) (emphasis added).
75. See Sparks v. Childers, 47 S.W. 316, 318-19 (Indian Terr. 1898); see also RESTATEMENT OF
SEcURrrY § 104 special note (1991) (stating that the term "indemnity" is often used as a synonym for
"reimbursement").
76. See 15 OKLA. S'rAT. §§ 421-30 (1991); Thomas v. Williams, 49 P.2d 557, 562 (Okla. 1935)
(citing Fischer v. Bashwitz, 5 P.2d 356, 358 (Okla. 193 1) and holding that an indemnity contract is valid
even though it is not in writing).
77. See RESTATEMEN4T (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 18 cmt. a (1996).
78. See id. §§ 18, 2, 22, 26, 27.
79. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 30 (West 1998) for a good, concise discussion




thereof, the principal debtor is bound to reimburse the surety for what it has
disbursed, including necessary costs and expenses. It should be noted that under the
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty, a surety would not be entitled to
reimbursement unless the principal has notice of the obligation, based on the theory
that the duty to reimburse arises out of an implied-in-law contract between the
principal debtor and the surety80 Without the notice, the Restatement (Third) does
not charge the principal debtor with the implied contract. In the absence of notice
of the surety obligation, the recourse of a surety under the Restatement (Third) lies
in restitution.' Title 15, section 381 does not impose notice as a requirement for the
duty to reimburse. However, Oklahoma courts have held that the duty to reimburse
is based on an implied obligation of the principal debtor.' Thus, it is possible that
Oklahoma courts would require notice as a prerequisite to the duty to reimburse.
However, this would probably be irrelevant because, although the right to restitution
is not provided in the Oklahoma surety statutes, a surety would likely be entitled
under Oklahoma case law to the equitable remedy of restitution to prevent the unjust
enrichment of the principal debtor.'
Section 3-419(e) of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code provides that an
accommodation party is entitled to reimbursement from the accommodated party on
the instrument. Unlike the view of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and
Guaranty, the duty of an accommodated party arises whether it has notice of the
accommodation or not.' Thus, any right of an accommodation party to restitution
is superfluous.' In addition, section 3-419(e) specifically recognizes the accom-
modation party's right to enforce the instrument against the accommodated party.'
Reimbursement and the right to enforce the instrument, however, are not the
accommodation party's exclusive remedies. Section 1-103 provides that other state
law will apply unless specifically displaced by the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial
Code. Thus, any other rights of a surety under Oklahoma law, such as subrogation,
would also be available to accommodation parties."
The specific recourse available to a guarantor is unclear. The Oklahoma guaranty
statutes do not provide for any recourse against the principal debtor; and, while
Oklahoma cases have recognized that a guarantor has recourse against the debtor,
exactly what recourse the guarantor has is not entirely clear. The Oklahoma Supreme
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 22 & cmt. a (1996).
8 1. See id. § 22 cmt. a.
82. See id. § 26 & cmt. b.
83. See Keyes v. Dyer, 243 P.2d 710, 712 (Okla. 1952).
84. See N.C. Corff Partnership, Ltd. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996)
(recognizing that, under Oklahoma law, restitution is an equitable remedy allowing a party to recover for
the unjust enrichment of another).
85. See PEB Commentary No. I1: Suretyship Issues Under Sections 3-116, 3-305. 3-415, 3-419,
and 3-605, 3B U.L.A. 120 (1993).
86. See iL
87. See id. (recognizing that providing for the accommodation party to enforce the instrument
against the accommodated parly essentially codifies the accommodation parties right to subrogation).
88. See 12A OKLA. STA'. ANN. § 3-419 Okla. cmt. 4 (West 1998).
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Court in Moore v. White" held that a guarantor was entitled to be subrogated to the
rights of the creditor when it paid the principal obligation.' The Moore court
reasoned that the rights of a guarantor upon payment of the principal obligation are
not distinguishable from the rights of a surety.9' Thus, the court concluded that the
guarantor was entitled to the right of subrogation provided to sureties under section
382.' Although no other courts have specifically addressed this issue, under the
reasoning of Moore a guarantor would be entitled to all the rights of a surety under
the Oklahoma surety statutes, which would include the rights of exoneration,
reimbursement, and subrogation." In addition, in Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National
Educators Life Insurance Co.,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted in dicta that a
guarantor would be entitled to protect itself by suing a debtor for restitution.Y
Therefore, although the rights of a guarantor against the principal debtor are not
settled, it would seem that a guarantor has all the rights of a surety under the
Oklahoma surety statutes along with the right to sue for restitution.
A guarantor should be entitled to the rights of exoneration, reimbursement,
subrogation and restitution without requiring that the guarantor fall under the
Oklahoma surety statutes. The Oklahoma guarantor statutes do not specifically
foreclose these remedies; thus, those remedies should be available to the guarantor
based on general rules of common law and equity. Exoneration is merely a right
based on the fact that the principal debtor has the primary duty to perform its
obligation.' The duty to reimburse the guarantor is based on an implied in law
contract between the guarantor and the principal debtor that the debtor should bear
the cost of performance because the debtor has the principal duty to perform.
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine which is applicable whenever a party pays the
obligation of another who was primarily liable and who should have discharged the
obligation.98 Restitution is an equitable remedy which should be available to the
guarantor whenever necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the principal
debtors." Thus, under general principles of law and equity, a guarantor should be
entitled to all these rights under Oklahoma law.
89. 603 P.2d 1119 (Okla. 1979).
90. See id. at 1121.
91. See id. The cotrt noted that under section 1-201(40) of the Oklahoma Commercial Code
"'surety' includes guarantor."
92. See Moore, 603 P.2d at 1121.
93. See Cormack & McCarroll, supra note 58, at 403 (maintaining that the remedies available to
sureties under Oklahoma',; surety statutes should be equally applicable to guarantors).
94. 529 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1975).
95. See id. at 986.
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 21 & cmt. a (1996).
97. See Keyes v. Dyer. 243 P.2d 710. 712 (Okla. 1952): Sparks v. Childers, 47 S.W. 316, 318-19
(Indian Terr. 1898).
98. See Maryland Cs. Co. v. King. 381 P.2d 153. 157 (Okla. 1963) (citing Fourth Nat'l Bank of
Tulsa v. Board of Comm'rs of Craig County. 95 P.2d 878. 879 (Okla. 1939).




II. Waiver of Guarantor's Rights Under Oklahoma Law
A. Waiver of Guarantor's Rights
1. Waiver and Consent
The suretyship defenses are for the protection of the guarantor." Accordingly,
guarantors have been allowed to give up the protection of the suretyship defenses. 1'
Guarantors are allowed to forego the protection of the suretyship defenses either
through consenting to the action.of the creditor that provides the defense or, more
importantly, through a waiver in the guaranty agreement."° In addition, based on
the guarantor's freedom of contract, it is generally recognized that a guarantor can
waive any defense of the principal that is available to the guarantor." Guaranty
agreements commonly contain clauses which waive defenses available to the
guarantor."4 Waiver clauses commonly waive defenses such as diligence,
presentment, protest, notice of dishonor, demand for payment, enforcement, extension
of time for payment, notice of acceptance, enforcement without resorting to collateral,
release or subordination of collateral, or partial release of liability."
Oklahoma courts have consistently upheld the guarantor's ability to waive the
suretyship defenses and any other statutory protections given to guarantors." For
example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in First National Bank and Trust Co. of
Vinita v. Kissee04 held that a guarantor was not entitled to discharge based on an
extension of time for payment of the original obligation of the debtor because the
guarantor had agreed to renewals or extensions in the guaranty agreement."4 In
addition, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milburn," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a guarantor had waived the right to a
100. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 48 cmt. a (1996).
101. See id,
102. See, e.g., 15 OKLA. STAT. § 338 (1991) (stating that a guarantor is discharged by any act of
the creditor which changes the original obligation or changes the remedies available to the creditor unless
the guarantor consents to the action of the creditor); Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 830 P.2d
1355, 1363-64 (Okla. 1992) (recognizing that guarantors may waive any protections given by statute);
see also 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605(i) (West 1998) (providing that an accommodation party is not
entitled to a discharge under the suretyship defense if the accommodation party consents to the conduct
that is the basis of the discharge or the accommodation party waives the suretyship defense);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 48 (1996).
103. See RESTATEMENT (TMRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §§ 34 cmt. a & 6 (1996).
104. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 31 (West 1998).
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Founders, 830 P.2d at 1363-64 (holding that the statutory protections given to
guarantor's may be relinquished by statutory waiver).
107. 859 P.2d 502 (Okla. 1993).
108. See id. at 508; see also Bennett v. Checotah State Bank of Checotah, 56 P.2d 848, 850 (Okla.
1936) (holding that a guarantor was not entitled to discharge based on extension given to the principal
because the guarantor consented to any extension in the guaranty agreement); Stetler v. Boling, 152 P.
452, 454 (Okla. 1915) (recognizing that the creditor had the right to extend the principal's time of
payment based on a waiver in the guaranty agreement).
109. 615 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1980).
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discharge under section 338 of the Oklahoma guaranty statutes.. based on an
alteration of the original obligation because the guarantor expressly promised to pay
any existing and future debts of the principal."' While Kissee and Milburn dealt
with waiver of suretyship defenses, Oklahoma courts have also found waivers of
statutory protections that are not suretyship defenses. In Penner v. International
Harvester Co. of Anerica," the court held that notice of acceptance of an offer of
guaranty is not required if the notice is expressly waived in the guaranty
agreement."' These decisions clearly indicated that Oklahoma courts will uphold
contractual provisions in guarantees that waive the guarantor's rights.
With regard to accommodation parties, section 3-605(i) of the Oklahoma Uniform
Commercial Code provides that an accommodation party will not be discharged
based on a suretyship defense if the accommodation party consents to the action
giving rise to the defense, or if the instrument or a separate agreement provides for
waiver of defenses considered in section 3-605. While no Oklahoma court has
addressed the issue, commentators recognize that a mortgagor who becomes a surety
based on the transfer of the mortgaged property can waive the suretyship defenses
by consenting to the action taken by the mortgagee or by placing a waiver clause in
the original mortgage or promissory note given to the mortgagee."'
2. The Reservation of Rights Doctrine
In addition to consent and waiver, a guarantor or surety may be deprived of the
benefit of the suretyship defenses by a reservation of rights by the creditor."'
Under the reservation of rights doctrine, a guarantor or surety is not entitled to a
discharge based on the conduct of the creditor, such as an extension of time or
release of the principal, where the creditor reserves its rights against the surety or
guarantor."6 The creditor effects a reservation of rights by informing the principal
that it is reserving its rights against the guarantor or surety at the time the creditor
takes the action that would give rise to the discharge."7 The reservation must be
express, clear, and definite, and cannot be inferred."' Some courts have required
the reservation to be in writing if the extension or release is in writing."' The
110. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 338 (1991) (stating that a guarantor is discharged "if by any act of the
creditor, without the consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any
respect").
111. See Milburn, 615 F.2d at 899.
112. 41 P.2d 843 (Okla. 1935).
113. See id. at 844.
114. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 5.19, at 285-86.
115. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 24 (West 1998) (noting that where a surety
or guarantor does not meet the requirements of an accommodation party, the creditor may be able to
reserve its rights against the guarantor or surety); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 5.19, at 287-88
(recognizing that courts have allowed a mortgagee to reserve its rights against mortgagor who has
become a surety based on transfer of the mortgaged property).
116. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 24 (West 1998).
117. See RESTATEMr:NT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 38 emt. a (1996).
118. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 24 (West 1998).




creditor is not required to give notice to the guarantor or surety of the change in the
principal's obligation that was accompanied by the reservation of rights."
Two consequences follow from the reservation of rights. First, the reservation of
rights preserves the rights of the surety or guarantor against the principal as though
the creditor's conduct had never occurred.' For example, if the creditor had given
the principal an extension of time and reserved rights against the guarantor, the
guarantor would be entitled to pay the obligation on the original due date and
immediately exercise its rights of exoneration, reimbursement, or subrogation against
the principal as though the extension had not been given." Second, through the
reservation of rights, the creditor prevented the guarantor or surety from being
discharged based on the creditor's actions." This result was based on the theory
that by preserving the right of the surety or guarantor against the principal, the surety
or guarantor is protected from harm." The rationale is that if the surety or
guarantor had the same rights as it had before the extension of time or other conduct,
the surety or guarantor cannot be harmed by the creditor's conduct.
While the reservation of rights doctrine is well established at common law, official
comment 3 of section 3-605 of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code expressly
rejects the reservation of rights doctrine in relation to accommodation parties. The
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code reasons that since an
accommodation party is not entitled to a discharge if the accommodated party is
released under section 3-605(b) or is only discharged to the extent of loss under any
of the other suretyship defenses, the person entitled to enforce the instrument does
not need a reservation of rights to prevent a discharge of the accommodation
party."z However, while few Oklahoma cases address a creditor's reservation of
rights," Oklahoma courts will likely follow the common law reservation of rights
doctrine in relation to guarantors and sureties that do not fall under article 3.2 This
appears consistent with the Oklahoma law giving guarantors and sureties a complete
discharge under the suretyship defenses.
As evidenced by its rejection in article 3 of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial
Code, the reservation of rights doctrine has come under substantial criticism." The
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 38 cmt. a (1996).
121. See id.; 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 24 (West 1998).
122. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 38 cmt. a (1996).
123. See td.
124. See id.
125. See PEB Commentary No. 11: Suretyship Issues Under Sections 3-116, 3-305, 3-415, 3-419,
and 3-605, 3B U.L.A. 120 (1993).
126. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Inhofe, 16 F.3d 371, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying
Oklahoma law to discuss the effect of a reservation of rights on an alleged accord and satisfaction
between the debtor and creditor); Oil Field Gas Co. v. International Supply Co., 103 P.2d 91, 93 (Okla.
1940) (holding, without much discussion, that an endorser of notes was not discharged after a subsequent
note was issued because there was a "sufficient reservation of liability").
127. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 24 (West 1998).
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 38 cmt, a (1996) (rejecting the
reservation of rights doctrine); NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 20, § 5.19, at 287-88 (criticizing the
application of the reservation of rights doctrine in relation to mortgagors who become sureties after
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty raise two objections
to the reservation cf rights doctrine. First, a reservation of rights may cause unfair
surprise to the principal." For example, the principal may not realize that a release
accompanied by a reservation of rights did not relieve the principal of its duty to the
guarantor to perform the original obligation on its original terms.'" No valid reason
warrants an unsophisticated principal to interpret the creditor's statement that "I can
still sue the guarantor" to mean that "the guarantor can still sue the principal on the
original obligation."' 3 Second, the justification for the doctrine (that the preser-
vation of the surety's or guarantor's rights against the principal prevents any harm to
the surety or guarantor) is based on the assumption that the surety or guarantor is
ready and willing to perform and has been monitoring the principal's obligation.'
The reservation of rights doctrine does not require any notice to the surety or
guarantor. If the guarantor is not called upon to perform at the time the obligation
becomes due, it is likely to assume that the principal has performed. Thus, even if
the surety or guarantor was ready and willing to perform, it may not know that it
needs to do so in order to prevent any loss.' In light of the problems with the
reservation of rights doctrine, Oklahoma courts should consider adopting the modem
view that "the traditional reservation of rights doctrine has outlived whatever
usefulness it may have had. '""
Based on these problems with the traditional reservation of rights doctrine, the
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty has adopted a rule which allows the
creditor to "preserve the secondary obligor's recourse.""'3 Under section 38 of the
Restatement (Third), when the creditor releases a debtor from, or extends the time
for performance of, an obligation to pay money, the release or extension results in
a "preservation of the secondary obligor's recourse"" in relation to that duty if the
release or extension expressly provides that: (1) the creditor retains the right to seek
performance from the surety or guaranty; and (2) the rights of the guarantor or surety
to seek recourse from the debtor continue as though the release or extension had not
been given. 37 A "preservation of the secondary obligor's recourse" does not prevent
a discharge of the surety or guarantor.3" Under sections 39 and 40 of the Res-
tatement (Third), th- discharge of the surety or guarantor is still determined based on
the loss suffered by the surety or guarantor because of the release or extension.
However, the preservation of recourse allows the creditor to minimize the loss to the
transfer of the mortgaged property).
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 38 cmt. a (1996).
130. See id.
131. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 5.19, at 289.
132. See RESTATEitENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 38 cmt. a (1996).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. The Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty refers to guarantors and sureties
generically as "secondary obligers."
136. RESTATEMEN" (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 38 (1996).
137. See id. § 38(a).




surety or guarantor by preserving the surety's or guarantor's rights against the
principal. Thus, the preservation of recourse minimizes the loss that would result to
the surety or guarantor from impairment of its right to reimbursement and
subrogation, because of a release or extension, while preventing any unfair surprise
to the principal."9 Notably, while section 38 does not require notice to the surety
or guarantor, notice may still be necessary to prevent any loss suffered by the surety
or guarantor caused by the passage of time between release or extension accompanied
by the preservation of the rights and when the surety or guarantor learns of release
or extension.'" Additionally, section 34 of the Restatement (Third) is consistent
with rules relating to the suretyship defenses under section 3-605 of the Oklahoma
Uniform Commercial Code.
141
B. Waiver of Guarantor's Rights After the Application of the Oklahoma Anti-
Deficiency Statute
In mortgage transactions, the issue of a guarantor's ability to waive its rights arises
most often concerning the application of anti-deficiency statutes. Anti-deficiency
statutes may limit or bar the ability of a mortgagee to get a deficiency judgment after
foreclosure.' During the 1930s - a time of a depressed economy and consequent
deflated land value - states enacted these anti-deficiency statutes to protect mortgage
debtors from personal liability after a foreclosure.'43 Though these statutes were
aimed at protecting mortgage debtors during the depression of the 1930s, many of
these statutes, including Oklahoma's, survive today.'"
Because these statutes sometimes place significant limitations on the liability of
mortgage debtors and because mortgage debtors are not generally allowed to waive
the protection of anti-deficiency statutes,'" mortgagees often look to guarantors to
satisfy the mortgage debtor's obligation. However, guarantors often argue that they
should also get the protection of the anti-deficiency statutes and that they, like the
mortgage debtor, should not be able to waive these protections.
1. Oklahoma Anti-Deficiency Statutes
Oklahoma's main anti-deficiency statute is title 12, section 686, which governs
judicial foreclosures of mortgages.'" The anti-deficiency provisions were added to
section 686 in 1941 and were based on the New York anti-deficiency statute.47
139. See id.
140. See id. § 38 cmt. b.
141. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 24 (West 1998).
142. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 8.3; J. A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation,
Mortgages: Effect Upon Obligation of Guarantor or Surety of Statute Forbidding or Restricting
Deficiency Judgements, 76 A.L.R.3d 554, § 2 (1974).
143. See Riverside NatI Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 440 (Okla. 1980).
144. See NELSON & WHriMAN, supra note 20, § 8.3.
145. See Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1359 n.4 (Okla. 1992); see also
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 8.3, at 591.
146. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 686 (1991) ("section 686").
147. The New York statute which provided the basis for the anti-deficiency provision of section 686
is located today at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 1371 (McKinney 1979). For a discussion of the history of
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Section 686 provides two protections to mortgage debtors.
First, section 686 requires that a creditor must seek a deficiency judgment within
ninety days after the date of the foreclosure sale. Section 686 goes on to state that
"if no motion for a deficiency judgment shall be made as herein prescribed the
proceeds of the sale regardless of amount shall be deemed to be in full satisfaction
of the mortgage debt and no right to recover any deficiency in any action or
proceeding shall exist."'" While the time limitation is, arguably, a short statute of
limitations, courts have interpreted the ninety-day limitation of section 686 to
completely extinguish and discharge the debt.49
Second, section 686 provides a set-off for the market value of the mortgage
property. This set-off is provided in two provisions of section 686. First, section 686
provides a set-off of the fair market value of the property in determining the
deficiency judgmernt. This part states that the "deficiency judgment shall be for an
amount equal to the sum of the amount owing by the party liable as determined by
the judgment [plus interest and costs], less the market value as determined by the
court or the sale price of the property whichever shall be the higher."" Second, the
last part of section 686 provides a set-off for the fair market value of the mortgaged
property in actions to recover for the mortgage debt that are not actions to foreclose
the mortgage. The language of this last section seems most important to the issue of
whether guarantors should be entitled to a set-off of fair market value of the
mortgaged property. The last paragraph of section 686 provides that:
in any action . . . . other than an action to foreclose a mortgage, to
recover a judgment for any indebtedness secured by a mortgage on real
property and which originated simultaneously with such mortgage and
which is secured solely by such mortgage, against any person or
corporation directly or indirectly or contingently liable therefor, any party
against whom a money judgment is demanded, shall be entitled to set off
the fair and reasonable market value of the mortgaged property less the
amounts owed on prior liens and encumbrances.'
It seems that this section is aimed at preventing a mortgagee from evading the anti-
deficiency statute by merely suing on the debt instead of foreclosing on the mortgage.
However, New York courts, interpreting the statute which was the basis for this
provision of section 686, have held that identical language extended to protect
guarantors of mortgage loans because the guarantors were "contingently liable" under
the statute.'2
the 90-day deficiency limitation of section 686, see Ingerton v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 291 F.2d
662, 665 (10th Cir. 1961).
148. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 686.
149. See Ingerton, 291 F.2d at 665; Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National Educators Life Ins. Co., 529
P.2d 984, 986 (Okla. 1975).
150. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 686.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. See Klinke v. Samuels, 190 N.E. 324, 326 (N.Y. 1934). However, it seems that the fair market




Additional anti-deficiency protections are located in Oklahoma's power of sale
statute located at title 46, section 43. Section 43 includes three anti-deficiency
protections for mortgagors: (1) mortgagors are entitled to elect against a deficiency
if the power of sale is exercised against the mortgagor's homestead;" (2)
mortgagors are entitled to credit for the fair market value of the mortgaged property
if the property is not the mortgagor's homestead; and (3) any action for a
deficiency on non-homestead property must be commenced within 90 days of the
date of the sale.'55 It seems clear, by the consistent use of the term "mortgagor" in
all the anti-deficiency provisions, that the protections of section 43 are not aimed at
guarantors.
2. Effect of the Oklahoma Anti-Deficiency Statute on Guarantor Liability
Oklahoma first considered the effect of section 686 on guarantor liability in
Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National Educators Life Insurance Co. 56 The Apache court
held that the guarantor was not liable for the deficiency remaining after the
foreclosure of the mortgage because the creditor had failed to seek the deficiency
from the mortgage debtor within the ninety-day period provided by section 686. In
Apache, the creditor attempted to collect a deficiency from the guarantors of a
mortgage note approximately five years after the foreclosure sale of the property was
confirmed. The creditor admitted that his failure to seek a deficiency judgment within
the ninety-day period provided by section 686 barred any action to collect the
deficiency from the mortgage debtor. However, the creditor argued that the limitation
in section 686 was a mere statute of limitations that would not bar an action to
recover the deficiency from that guarantor under Oklahoma law.
The Apache court admitted that under Oklahoma law the running of a statute of
limitations against the principal does not bar an action to collect the debt from the
guarantor. The court held that the ninety-day limitation of section 686 was not a
statute of limitations." The court stated that the running of the ninety-day
limitation period of section 686 "specifically discharges and extinguishes the
debt."158
After deciding that the ninety-day limitation was not a statute of limitations, the
Apache court considered what effect the discharge of the mortgage debtor's obligation
would have on the obligation of the guarantor. The court first noted that if a cause
of action against the principal is barred by a statute of limitation, the debt is not
discharged. Thus, a guarantor should be required to pay the debt because it can
protect itself by suing the principal for restitution for satisfying the principal's
debt. ' 9 In the case where the debt has been completely discharged and satisfied
under section 686, however, the court concluded that the guarantor would have no
153. See 46 OKLA. STAT. § 43(A)(2)(c) (1991).
154. See id. § 43(A)(2)(d).
155. See id
156. 529 P.2d 984 (Okla. 1974).
157. See id. at 986.
158. Id.
159. See id.
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recourse against th-, principal because the principal would have a complete defense
based on satisfaction of the debt."w The court noted that a guarantor is only liable
to the creditor when the debt is not satisfied.
1 61
The Apache court concluded by looking at the Oklahoma guaranty statutes.
Relying on title 15, sections 338l" and 344" of the Oklahoma Statutes, the court
held that the guarantors were discharged because the "failure or omission of the
creditor in seeking a deficiency judgment . . . altered, impaired, and led to the
discharge of the debtor's obligation."
While Apache made clear that a guarantor could be discharged through application
of section 686, the decision did not clearly state the basis for this protection. It was
not clear whether the protection given to debtors under section 686 was extended to
guarantors or whether the result in Apache was a mere application of Oklahoma's
statutory "suretyship defenses." In addition, because the two sentence guaranty
agreement considered in Apache had no waiver provisions, it remained unclear
whether a guarantor could waive the protection given by the Apache court.
3. Guarantor's Ability to Waive Rights After Application of the Oklahoma Anti-
Deficiency Statute
In Riverside National Bank v. Manolakis,"64 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma took
the opportunity to clarify its decision in Apache. The Riverside court addressed two
issues: (1) whether the "fictional satisfaction of the mortgage debt" provided by the
ninety-day limitation of section 686 gives all guarantors the same protection that is
given to mortgage debtors; and (2) if not, whether the discharge of the mortgage debt
by operation of section 686, discharges the guarantor because the failure to seek a
timely deficiency judgment was an "intervention or omission" under title 15, section
344 of the Oklahoma statutes.' s
Concerning the first issue, the Riverside court held that the guarantor is not
automatically entitled to the benefit of the discharge given mortgage debtors by
section 686." The court reasoned that the obligation of a guarantor is a collateral
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 338 (1991). The section states that
[a] guarantor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if
by any act of the creditor, without the consent of the guarantor, the original obligation of
the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the
principal, in re.pect thereto, in any way impaired or suspended.
Id.
163. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 344 (1991). The section states that "[a] guarantor is not exonerated by the
discharge of his principal by operation of law, without the intervention or omission~of the creditor." Id.
164. 613 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1980).
165. See id. at 439.
166. See id. at 440. In reaching this holding the Riverside court distinguished contrary New York
decisions based on the fact the Oklahoma and New York took different views of the guaranty
relationship. The Riverside court maintained that Oklahoma had adopted separate statutes to regulate





obligation that is completely independent and separate from the obligation of the
principal debtor.67 The Riverside court maintained that the anti-deficiency provision
of section 686 relates exclusively to the debtor/creditor relationship and has no
application to "the more complex tri-partite relationship of guarantor/debtor/creditor
or with the rights under a guaranty agreement.""l  The court stated that the
obligations involved in the guarantor/debtor/creditor relationship are regulated by the
guaranty statutes located in title 15, sections 321-344 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
While the court noted that a failure by the creditor may impair the guarantor's rights
to proceed against the principal, the guarantor will not be discharged in every case
because the guarantor's liability depends on the nature of the guarantor's contract with
the creditor. The Riverside court concluded that the protection of section 686 applies
only to debtors, and does not extend to automatically protect guarantors.
69
Upon determining that guarantors do not fall under the protection of section 686,
the Riverside court considered the second issue of whether the failure to seek a
deficiency judgment discharged the guarantor's obligation based on section 344 of the
Oklahoma guaranty statutes. The Riverside court looked at the guarantor's obligation
and held that the guarantor had waived any defenses under section 344."'° The court
noted that "the guarantor agreed that his liability would not be 'affected or impaired'
by any 'failure, neglect or omission' of the bank to protect, in any manner, the
collection of the indebtedness or the security given therefor."'' The court held this
promise was sufficient to waive any discharge that would be provided under section
3 44 ." In support of its interpretation of the guarantor's promise, the Riverside court
noted that the terms of the guaranty agreement should be read in favor of the creditor
and against the guarantor."
The Riverside decision seems to stand for three propositions: (1) guarantors are
not automatically protected by the "fictional satisfaction" provided by the ninety-day
limitation on deficiency judgments in section 686; (2) the effect of a creditor's failure
to seek a deficiency judgment as required by section 686 is to be determined by the
guarantor's contract and the Oklahoma guaranty statutes; and (3) a guarantor can
waive any statutory guaranty defenses it may have based on the creditor's failure to
seek a deficiency judgment under section 686. After Riverside, Apache apparently
stands for the proposition that the failure to seek a timely deficiency judgment can
167. See id. at 441.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 442.
171. Id.
172. See id. As support for finding that the guarantor had waived the protections of section 344,
the Riverside court cited Black v. O'Haver, 567 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969
(1978). In Black, the court held that a clause stating that the guarantor had consented to liability
notwithstanding "the release of the Borrower from performance or observance of any of the agreements,
covenants, terms or conditions contained in (the Agreement and the Mortgage) by operation of law" was
sufficient to deprive the guarantor of any defense it might have based on the "fictional satisfaction" of
the principal's obligation under section 686. Id. at 372.
173. See Riverside, 613 P.2d at 442.
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result in a discharge of the guarantor based solely on an application of title 15,
sections 344, 3 3 S.'"
While the Riverside court clarified the effect of the ninety-day limitation of section
686 on a guarantor's obligations, the issue of how the set-off provisions of section
686 affects the obligations of guarantors remained unresolved. Strong argument
supports that guarantors should be entitled to a set-off for the fair market value of the
mortgage property because the language of section 686 provides such set-off to
persons "indirectly or contingently liable."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court was confronted with this issue in Founders Bank
and Trust Co. v. Upsher.1 5 The Founders court held that based on the language of
the guaranty agreements, the guarantors had waived any right to set-off, and thus, the
court declined to decide whether the set-off provided by section 686 protected
guarantors.'76
In Founders, the bank lent money to a limited partnership. The bank secured the
loan through a mortgage on real property and five guarantees executed by the
partners. The litigation in Founders involved three limited partners who had
guaranteed "the absolute, complete and punctual performance" of the partnership on
the loan. The guaranty agreements executed by the three limited partners were
identical except for provisions which specified a fixed percentage of the total unpaid
obligation each guarantor would bear. One limited partner guaranteed twenty-five
percent of the unpaid balance of the loan, while the other two limited partners each
guaranteed twelve and one-half percent of the unpaid balance. In determining the
issue of a set-off under section 686, the court focused on Clause 4 of the guaranty
agreement. Clause 4 provided the methods in which the bank could pursue remedies
upon the default of the principal.
4. Nothing herein contained will limit the Bank in exercising any rights
held under any one or more of the Loan Documents. On the occurrence
of any event of Default under the Loan Documents or this Agreement,
the Bank will be entitled to selectively and successively enforce any one
or more of the rights held by the Bank and such action will not be
deemed a waiver of any other right held by the Bank. All of the
remedies of the Bank under this Agreement and the Loan Documents are
cumulative and not alternative. If the Bank elects to foreclose any lien
created by the Loan Documents, the Bank is authorized to purchase for
the account of the Bank all or any part of the collateral covered by such
lien... and to credit the amount recovered first against that portion of
174. See Bank of Okla. v. Welco, Inc., 898 P.2d 172, 178 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no waiver
and relying on Apache to hold that a guarantor was exonerated under title 15, section 344 because the
creditor failed to pursue a timely deficiency judgement under section 686); INA Life Ins. Co. v.
Brandywine Assoc., Ltd., 800 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that Apache was
based on an application of title 15, sections 338, 344).
175. 830 P.2d 13;5 (Okla. 1992). For a good discussion of the Founders decision, see John P.
Roberts, Guarantor's Liability: Issues Revisited, 63 OKLA. B.J. 3127 (1992).




the Loan for which the Guarantor is not liable with any balance
remaining to be applied in reduction of the liability of the Guarantor
hereunder.'"
After the partnership defaulted on the loan, the bank sued (1) on the promissory
note, (2) to enforce the mortgage, and (3) to enforce the guaranty agreements. After
the trial court gave the bank judgment against the three guarantors, the guarantors
argued that section 686 entitled them to an offset of the fair market value of the
mortgage property and not just a credit for the actual value received at the sheriffs
sale. Subsequently, the bank purchased the property at the sheriffs sale. The trial
court reduced the bank's judgment by the proceeds of the sheriffs sale, but refused
to credit the guarantors with the fair market value of the property.
In determining whether the guarantors got the benefit of the set-off provisions of
section 686, the Founders court looked at the guaranty contracts. The court held that
the guarantor's obligation is collateral to the principal obligation and the terms of the
guarantor's contract will govern the extent of the guarantor's obligation.' The court
stated that the obligation of a guarantor is not dependent upon the existence of the
principal's debt; rather, the guarantor's obligation is based solely on the terms of the
guarantor's separate and independent contract." From the language of Clause 4 of
the guaranty contracts, the court first determined that the parties intended that the
balance owed by the guarantors was to be determined by giving credit for the
sheriffs sale proceeds, and the guaranty contract did not provide for a set-off of the
fair market value of the mortgaged property. 8 ' Second, the court noted that Clause
4 provided that all of the bank's remedies were cumulative and that no action taken
by the bank would waive any of the bank's other rights. 8' The court held that these
two sections of Clause 4 were sufficient to waive any right to a set-off the guarantors
might have under section 686."u
The Founders court noted that the application of the set-off provisions of section
686 creates a built-in loss to the creditor of the difference between the fair market
value of the property and the foreclosure sale proceeds.'83 Creditors are* forced to
protect themselves from this built-in loss by obtaining a guaranty. The Founders
court maintained that guarantors should be allowed to waive any right to a set-off
because lenders should be deprived of the ability to bargain against the built-in loss
resulting from section 686."M The court noted that while mortgage debtors would
not be allowed to waive the benefits of section 686, persons other than mortgage
177. Id. at 1358 n.1 (emphasis added).
178. See id. at 1361.
179. See id. at 1362-63.,
180. See id. at 1362.
181. See id. at 1363.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1362 n.23.
184. See id.
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debtors are allowed to waive the right to set off the fair market value of mortgaged
property.'"
The Founders court determined that the waiver disposed of any need to determine
whether the set-off provisions of section 686 protected guarantors. However, in a
footnote the court seemed to adhere to its ruling in Riverside that section 686 applied
only to the debtor/creditor relationship.'"
In addition to the issues relating to whether the guarantors fell under the protection
of section 686, the court considered whether the Oklahoma guaranty statutes provided
the guarantors any defenses based on the reduction of the principal's obligation under
set-off provisions of section 686. First, the court considered title 15, section 334,
which provides that the obligation of a guarantor must be neither larger in amount
nor in any respects more burdensome than the obligation of the principal. The
Founders court held that section 334 "relates to conditions at the time of the
guaranty's execution.""' The court reasoned that the guaranty agreement's original
obligation may be fixed to assure that the guarantor's obligation does not exceed that
of the principal; however, the guarantor may agree that, upon the occurrence of a
specified event, its liability will remain the same although the principal's obligation
may be decreased." The court held that the guarantors had agreed that upon the
sale of the mortgaged property, their liability would be determined based on a credit
for the sale proceeds even though the liability of the principal may be reduced by the
fair market value of the property.' Thus, the Founders court essentially deter-
mined that the guarantors had waived the protections of section 334. Second, the
Founders court considered the application of title 15, section 341, which provides
that the acceptance by the creditor of partial satisfaction of the principal's obligation
reduces the obligation of the guarantor in same measure. Because the guaranty
agreement detailed the method for crediting the actual proceeds of the mortgage
foreclosure, the court determined that the guarantors had waived any statutory right
to set-off provided by section 341."9
In Founders, the Oklahoma Supreme Court established a strong policy in favor of
allowing guarantors to waive any statutory protections they may have. The Founders
court established that even if guarantors did come under the protection of the set-off
provisions of section 686, those guarantors, unlike mortgage debtors, would be
allowed to waive that protection. In addition, courts following Founders have
allowed waivers of any right to set off under guaranty language much less specific
than that in Founders."
185. See id. at 1359 n.4.
186. See id. at 1359 n.31.
187. Id. at 1363 & n.27 (citing Bloom v. Bender, 313 P.2d 568, 574 (Cal. 1957)).
188. See id. at 1363.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 1364.
191. In Local Federal Bank v. Jico, Inc., 842 P.2d 368, 370 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992), the court found
a waiver of any right to set-off based on provisions of the guaranty agreement which granted the
Bank the rights to (1) proceed directly against Guarantors without prior liquidation of any




Since Founders, no published Oklahoma decision has squarely addressed the issue
of whether guarantors are protected by the set-off provisions of section 686.'"
However, in an unpublished opinion, Paller v. Group Limited Partnership,'93 the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals considered whether a guarantor was entitled to a set-off
after mortgage foreclosure when there was no waiver of set-off. After noting that the
law on this issue was "less than clear," the Paller court rejected a rule that guarantors
fall under the protection of the set-off provisions of section 686.'"' However, the
court determined that since the guarantors had not waived any right to set-off of the
fair market value of the mortgage property, the guarantor was entitled to the set-off
because the principal was entitled to such a set-off. The court reasoned that if the
guarantor was not given the set-off, his obligation would be greater than that of the
principal in violation of title 15, section 334.9
Thus, it seems that courts are going the follow the dicta in Founders that the set-
off provisions of section 686 are not directly applicable to guarantors. The Paller
court seemed to take the approach of Apache and Riverside that any effect on the
guarantor's obligation based on the application of the anti-deficiency provisions of
section 686 must be determined under an application of the Oklahoma guaranty
statutes. After Paller, it will not matter if guarantors come directly under the
protection of section 686 because, absent a waiver, the guarantor will get the benefit
of the set-off based on an application of the Oklahoma guaranty statutes.
While the Riverside and Founders line of cases have established a strong. policy
of allowing guarantors to waive any direct or indirect protection under the application
of section 686, several issues remain unresolved. First, should guarantors fall directly
under the protections of section 686, especially the set-off provisions? Second, if we
allow guarantors to waive the effects of section 686, will the guarantors be able to
get recourse from the principal? Third, how will the Oklahoma courts treat the anti-
deficiency protections located in the Oklahoma power of sale statute? Fourth, how
will the Oklahoma courts treat accommodation parties and sureties under section 686?
These issues will be addressed in part DI of this comment.
C. Language Required to Waive Guarantor's Rights
The Founders court laid out the standard for determining whether contractual
language is sufficient to waive a guarantor's statutory rights. The court maintained
exchange, release or surrender any and all collateral for the obligation without impairing
Guarantor's obligations to the Bank.
Id. In Local Federal, four of the guarantors involved had signed an additional guaranty agreement which
contained a provision specifically waiving any right to set-off. However, one guarantor/appellant had
only signed the agreement containing the above stated language. Thus, that guarantor's waiver of set-off
under section 686 must have been based solely on the above stated waiver provisions.
192. Like the Founders court, the court in Local Federal Bank, 842 P.2d at 370, found it
unnecessary to determine whether guarantors where entitle to a set-off under section 686 because the
guarantors had waived any right to set-off.
193. 68 OKLA. B.J. 2579 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997) (unpublished opinion).
194. See id. at 2579. The court stated that "the law does not specifically provide for applicability
of [the set-off provisions of section 686] to guarantors." Id.
195. See id.
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that "[t]o escape the incidence of general law, the agreement must not be silent as to
the parties' intent vis-A-vis the applicable law."'" This standard, however, should
not be read strictly. [he result in Founders makes it clear that an expression of intent
to waive guaranty statutes does not require that the statute be expressly recognized.
The court will likely look at the parties' intent based on the contract language and
determine whether that expression of intent is inconsistent with the applicable law.
The key language used in the Founders guaranty agreement did not purport to waive
any applicable law; :t only described what would happen if the mortgaged property
was sold."9 The Founders court found this expression of the parties' intent
inconsistent with applicable statutory protections and thus found that the parties had
waived those protections.9 '
Oklahoma case law raises several notable issues. First, the statement that a
guaranty is "absolute" and/or "unconditional" will not be effective to waive the
general suretyship da-fenses.'" Under title 15, section 326, however, the statement
that a guaranty is "absolute" effectively waives the requirement of notice of
acceptance. Second, the waiver will clearly be effective if it expressly mentions the
conduct that would have provided the basis for the discharge.' However, the
language need not specify the conduct that would provide the basis for the discharge
if it is clear what defense is being waived."' Third, if the waiver is too specific,
the court may construe it strictly. For example, where the guarantor gave "consent
that the time of payment be extended without notice," the court held that the waiver
applied to only one extension and the guarantor was given discharge because the
creditor gave the debtor more than one extension of time.
196. Founders Bank & Trust Co. v Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1364 n.32 (Okla. 1990) (citing Dickason
v. Dickason, 607 P.2d 674, 677 (1980)).
197. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
198. See Founders, 830 P.2d at 1362, 1364.
199. See Bank of Okla. v. Welco, 898 P.2d 172, 178 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the
guarantor was discharged based on the section 344 of the Oklahoma guaranty statutes although the
guaranty agreement stated that the guaranty was "absolute" and "unconditional"); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 44 cmt d (1996) (stating that a statement that a guaranty is
"absolute" or "unconditional" is not effective to waive suretyship defenses); 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
3-605 Okla. cmt. 31 (We,t 1998) (finding that the waiver must indicate the intent to waive suretyship
defenses). It seems that no Oklahoma cases seriously consider the statement that a guaranty is "absolute"
or "unconditional" in det.-rmining whether a guarantor has waived its right to discharge under the
Oklahoma guaranty statutes.
200. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 508 (Okla. 1993) (waiving
"extensions" of the underlying indebtedness); Haines Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Exline Gas Systems, 921
P.2d 955, 961 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996) (waiving the creditor's failure "to seek a deficiency judgement").
201. See, e.g., Riversde Natl Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 442 (Okla. 1980) (holding that the
guarantor had waived discharge under title 15, section 344 based on the creditor's failure to timely seek
a deficiency judgement where the guarantor agreed that "his liability would not be 'affected or impaired'
by any 'failure, neglect cor omission' of the bank to protect, in any manner, the collection of the
indebtedness or the security therefor"); INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brandywine Assoc., Ltd., 800 P.2d 1073,
1074, 1077 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that waiver of any right to set-off was effective to waive any




Section 3-605(i) of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code and its accom-
panying comments are much more helpful in determining what is required to waive
an accommodation party's suretyship defenses. Section 3-605(i) states that an
accommodation party may waive its section 3-605(i) defenses "either specifically or
by general language indicating that the parties waive defenses based on suretyship
or impairment of collateral." While section 3-605 clearly requires an "indicat[ion]
that the parties waive defenses," the Oklahoma Comments to section 3-605(i) state
that waiver language need not be precise or extensive and that a simple statement in
the instrument that "suretyship defenses are waived" would be sufficient to bind the
accommodation party.2 This requirement of general language eliminates the need
for lengthy waiver provisions that would likely not be read anyway. The Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code takes the view that general
language indicating a waiver of defenses will assure that "a diligent indorser or
accommodation party will, at least, not be unjustly surprised when it is asserted that
the terms of the instrument or agreement delete protections that would otherwise be
available."' However, the Oklahoma Comment recognizes two limitations on the
effectiveness of such general waivers. First, if the waiver of defenses outside of
section 3-605 is desired, the defenses should be specifically waived.' Thus, in the
context of accommodation parties in mortgage transactions, a specific waiver of an
accommodation party's rights based on the application of section 686 would likely
be required because the effects of section 686 probably do not fall under section 3-
605.5 Second, the drafter should try to avoid specific language concerning the
party that waives the defenses.' For example, if the instrument states that the
maker waives all suretyship defenses, then the waiver would apply only to an accom-
modation party who is a co-maker and would not extend to an indorser, surety,
guarantor, or accommodation party.'
When considering waivers in guaranty contracts, it is important to note that the
traditional definition of a waiver (the intentional relinquishment of a known right) is
not involved. A guarantor or surety need not know its legal rights in order to waive
them. The contractual waiver of suretyship rights "is not, strictly speaking, a waiver
but, rather, is simply a contract term that delineates the contours of the secondary
obligation." In addition, a creditor clearly has no duty to disclose or explain to a
guarantor or surety the legal effects of waiving grounds for discharge.
General rules are difficult to establish concerning what language is required to
waive the rights of a guarantor or surety under Oklahoma law. The best course of
action would be to draft the waiver clauses according to the Oklahoma guaranty and
surety statutes. The decisions in Riverside and Founders clearly indicate that the
rights of a guarantor or surety are based on these statutes. Waivers based on all the
202. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 31 (West 1998).
203. PEB Commentary No. 11: Suretyship Issues Under Sections 3-116. 3-305, 3-415, 3-419, and
3-605, 3B U.L.A. 120 (1993).
204. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 31 (West 1998).
205. See id. § 3-605 Oklahoma cmt. 21.
206. See id. § 3-605 Oklahoma cmt. 31.
207. See id.
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statutes granting a guarantor or surety "exoneration" would likely give the creditor
broad protection. Under Apache and Riverside, a waiver addressing the rights 6f a
guarantor or surety under sections 338 and 344 of the Oklahoma guaranty statutes
should ensure the waiver of a discharge based on the failure of a creditor to seek a
deficiency judgment under section 686. In addition, because the decisions have been
unclear on whether guarantors or sureties come under the direct protection of the set-
off provisions of section 686, drafters should probably include a specific provision
waiving any statutory right to set-off under section 686 if such a waiver is desired.
Finally, specific waivers should include any guarantor defenses that are common or
important in the circumstances to prevent litigation on such defenses under broad
waiver clauses.
D. Guarantor's Rights Against the Principal After Contractual Waive?"
An important issue involved in the contractual waiver of a guarantor's right is
whether the guarantor has recourse against the principal when it waives defenses to
performance that are available to principal. While the issue could arise with a
number of defenses available to the principal, this issue would most often arise in the
context of mortgage transactions in relation to the guarantor's waiver of the effects
of section 686 on ifs obligation. Thus, this issue will be analyzed based on a
hypothetical in that context. Oklahoma law on this issue is scarce. Thus, the
approaches taken by the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty will be considered in determining what an
Oklahoma court would likely do.
Assume that Bank made a loan to Principal and took a mortgage on Black Acre
as security. Bank also required a guaranty of the loan. Principal's father, Guarantor,
agreed to guaranty the loan. The guaranty agreement provided that "Guarantor's
liability would not ba affected by Bank's failure to seek a deficiency judgment from
208. This section will deal exclusively with waivers placed in the guaranty agreement. It should be
noted that there may be different rules concerning the guarantor's right to reimbursement in different
"waiver" situations. For example, where the guarantor "waived" a defense it had available by performing
without knowledge of that defense, the guarantor may be entitled to reimbursement. See 12A OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 3-419(e) Okla. cmt. 3 (West 1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND
GUARANTY § 24 & cmt. e (1996).
209. There seems to be no issue if the guarantor waived a defense, such as a "suretyship defense,"
that would not act as a defense to the principal's underlying obligation. For example, if the guarantor
waived modification of the underlying obligation, the guarantor should still have recourse against the
principal if it has to pay after the underlying obligation has been modified. Although guarantor had
waived a defense it had to payment (i.e., modification of the underlying obligation), such defense would
not be available to the principal, and the guarantor should be entitled to recourse through subrogation,
reimbursement, or restitution. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 108(l)(a) (1941) (providing for
reimbursement when a surety performs when it is entitled to a defense not available to the principal);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 27 & cmt. d (1996) (providing for subrogation
when a surety performs in spite of a "suretyship defense" not affecting the principals liability on the
underlying obligation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §§ 24(l)(f) cmt. c, 26
cmt. c (1996) (rejecting the view in Restatement of Security that reimbursement is proper when a surety
performs in spite of a defense that is not available to the principal, but maintaining that restitution is




Principal upon foreclosure of the mortgage."2 ' Principal defaults on the loan, and
Bank forecloses the mortgage. The proceeds of the sheriffs sale equal the fair market
value of the property; however, the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to satisfy the
loan. Bank fails to seek a timely deficiency judgment against Principal. On the other
hand, Bank is successful in collecting the deficiency from Guarantor because
Guarantor waived any defense it might have because of the Bank's failure to seek a
deficiency judgment. Will Guarantor be entitled to recover the deficiency that it had
to pay from Principal?
Guarantors generally have three methods of recourse from the principal after
satisfying the principal's obligation: subrogation, restitution, and reimbursement
"
Under the equitable right to subrogation, the guarantor is substituted to the position
of the creditor who received the payment2  However, Guarantor would only have
whatever rights Bank had against Principal. 3 Because Bank failed to pursue a
deficiency judgment under section 686, Principal's obligation to Bank is deemed to
be completely satisfied by the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. Thus, under his right
to subrogation, Guarantor would not be entitled to recover the deficiency from
Principal because Bank would have no right to recover that deficiency.214
Guarantors are also entitled to seek recourse from the principal in the form of
restitution.2 5 Under Oklahoma law, a person is entitled to restitution when there is
"enrichment to another coupled with resulting injustice.121 6 Restitution can arise
from expenditures by one person that add to the property of another or save the other
from loss or expense. 7 In the case of Guarantor, the payment has not enriched
Principal. Principal no longer owes any obligation to Bank because the underlying
obligation is completely satisfied by the operation of section 686. Guarantor's
satisfaction of the deficiency does not relieve Principal of any obligation; thus,
Principal is not enriched. Guarantor should not, therefore, be able to recover its
payment from Principal through restitution.
Finally, Guarantor could seek reimbursement from Principal. A guarantor's right
to reimbursement is an implied in law obligation of the principal to reimburse the
guarantor for the costs of performance."' Policy issues arise, however, when a duty
210. See a similar waiver provision upheld in Haines Pipeline Construction, Inc. v. Exline Gas
Systems, 921 P.2d 955, 961 & n.3 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
211. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
212. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 30 (West 1998).
213. See Moore v. White, 603 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Okla. 1979).
214. In dicta, the court in Dixon v. United States, 68 F.3d 1253, 1255 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying
Oklahoma law) reached the same result under similar facts. However, the court found that the guarantor,
a federal government agency, was entitled to be recover from the principal based on the government
agency's "independent contractual right of indemnity." Id.
215. See Apache Lanes, Inc. v. National Educ. Life Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 984, 986 (Okla. 1975).
216. N.C. Corff Partnership, Ltd. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Teel v. Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 767 P.2d 391, 398 (Okla. 1985)); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 26 & cmt. a (1996) (requiring that the principal be unjustly
enriched before the secondary obligor is entitled to restitution).
217. See N.C. Corif, 929 P.2d at 295.
218. See supra notes 85-89,93 and accompanying text; cf 15 OKLA. STAT. § 381 (1991) (providing
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to reimburse is found where the principal has a defense to the principal
obligation.219 If a duty is placed on the principal, the value of the defense is
obviated. Alternatively, if the principal is not required to reimburse, the ultimate cost
of performance will be borne by the guarantor rather than the principal.'m In the
case of Guarantor, the policy works strongly in favor of Principal. First, requiring
Principal to reimburse Guarantor would circumvent the protections of section 686.
Mortgage debtors are entitled to the absolute protection of section 686 and they
cannot waive that protection."' Requiring Principal to reimburse in this situation
would essentially deny Principal the protections of section 686. Second, denying
reimbursement does not seem unfair to Guarantor. Guarantor waived any protections
derived from the application of section 686. Thus, Guarantor essentially assumed the
risk that if Bank foreclosed and failed to seek a deficiency judgment, then it would
be liable for the deficiency even though Principal would not. Thus, Principal should
have no duty to reimburse Guarantor.
This result concerning Guarantor's right to reimbursement seems consistent with
section 3-419(e) of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code and section 24 of the
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty. The Oklahoma Comments to
section 3-419(e) consider the facts of the case to determine any conflict between the
accommodation party's right to reimbursement and the accommodated party's right
to raise a defense.' This would seemingly result in no duty to reimburse Guarantor
because of the strong policy in favor of allowing Principal to get the benefit of any
defenses under section 686. Under section 24 of the Restatement, Principal would
have no duty to reimburse Guarantor. Section 24(1)(c) provides that the principal
obligor has no duty of reimbursement when the principal obligor has a defense to the
underlying obligation that is not available to the secondary obligor under the terms
of the secondary obligation. Comment b and illustration 5 of section 24 clearly
establish that a guarantor who waives a defense available to the principal is not
entitled to reimbur;ement. The Restatement's drafters reasoned that to allow
reimbursement in such a situation would make the principal's defenses illusory.m
Guarantor must, therefore, bear the cost of Principal's deficiency without any
recourse against Principal through subrogation, restitution, or reimbursement. This
result is consistent with the conclusion in Apache that the guarantor is not entitled
to any recourse against the principal if the guarantor had been required to pay the
deficiency.m In Apache, the guarantor had not waived the protections of the
Oklahoma guaranty statutes and was discharged because the creditor's actions had
for reimbursement to sur.eties); 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(e) (1991) (providing for reimbursement to
accommodation parties).
219. See PEB Commentary No. 11: Suretyship Issues Under Sections 3-116, 3-305, 3-415, 3-419,
and 3-605, 3B-U.L.A. 123 (1993).
220. See id.
221. See Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1359 n.4 (Okla. 1992).
222. See 12A OKLa. STAT. ANN. § 3-419(e) Okla. cmt. 3 (West 1998).
223. See REsTAT-MI:NT (THIRD) OF SURMYStIP AND GUARANTY § 24 cmt. b (1996).




impaired the guarantor's remedies.' A different result concerning the guarantor's
right to recourse against the principal is difficult to justify when the guarantor waives
its statutory protections.
If a guarantor waives any statutory right to set-off arising under section 686, such
a guarantor would also not be entitled to any recourse against the principal. The
guarantor would confront the same issues as those related to subrogation, restitution,
and reimbursement. Allowing reimbursement in such a situation would indirectly
result in an unlawful waiver of the mortgage debtor's rights under section 686.
What about situations involving defenses, other than section 686, which are
available to the principal and have been waived by the guarantor? Any time the
principal has a defense to the underlying obligation, the guarantor will have no
apparent recourse through subrogation and restitution. The issue revolves around the
principal's duty of reimbursement. Under the approach of section 24(1)(c) of the
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty, the guarantor is seemingly not
entitled to reimbursement any time the principal has a defense to the underlying
obligation which was waived by the guarantor. However, the Oklahoma Comments
concerning reimbursement under section 3-419(e) of the Oklahoma Commercial Code
promote more flexibility in determining the accommodated party's duty of
reimbursement.
While the flexible approach under the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code seems
attractive, section 24(1)(c) of the Restatement (Third) is more appropriate for two
reasons. First, the rule under section 24(1)(c) gives a clear rule that is easy to apply.
This provides the parties with certainty in determining when the guarantor is entitled
to reimbursement. In addition, a clear rule allows the principal and guarantor to have
a background standard from which they can begin contracting. Second, the rationale
behind section 24(1)(c) is sound. Comment c to section 24 states that requiring a
principal to reimburse a guarantor when the principal had a defense that was waived
by the guarantor makes that defense valueless to the principal. Fairness dictates that
the guarantor should not be allowed to unilaterally deprive the principal of its
defenses. In such a situation, the guarantor realized it might have a defense to the
obligation because of a certain event and waived that defense. Through its right to
reimbursement, the guarantor should not be able to indirectly force the principal to
waive certain defenses based on the guarantor's waiver in its independent and
separate guaranty agreement. In addition, a guarantor would not reasonably believe
that it could waive defenses that would also be available to the principal and expect
to be protected by collecting from the principal.
The best rule mandates that whenever a guarantor waives defenses in the guaranty
agreement that are also available to the principal, the guarantor should not be entitled
to reimbursement from the principal whenever the principal had a defense to the
underlying obligation that the guarantor had waived in its guaranty agreement.'
225. See id. at 986-87.
226. See First Nat'l Park Bank v. Johnson, 553 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1977); Mutual Fin. Co. v.
Politzer, 256 N.E.2d 606, 612 (Ohio 1970). But see Knight v. Cheek, 396 A.2d 601, 603-04 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (stating that a principal had a duty to reimburse a guarantor when the guarantor was required to
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In addition, the guarantor in such a situation should not be entitled to recourse
through restitution or subrogation. Thus, if a guarantor must perform due to a waiver
of a defense that was available to the principal, then the guarantor should have no
recourse against tho principal.
III. Analysis of Oklahoma Law on the Waiver of Guarantor's Rights
As seen from the preceding discussion, Oklahoma courts have developed a strong
policy in favor of allowing guarantors to waive their statutory protections. This part
analyzes aspects of Oklahoma's waiver law. First, this part examines Oklahoma's
treatment of guarantor waiver in light of modem authority, namely the Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty. Second, this part considers possible limitations
on a guarantor's ability to waive defenses.
A. Comparison of Oklahoma's Strong Policy in Favor of Allowing Waiver of
Guarantor's Rights with Modem Jurisprudence
The decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Riverside and Founders have
established a strong policy in Oklahoma in favor of allowing guarantors to waive
their rights. These decisions clearly provide that a guaranty is an obligation collateral
to the principal obligation and that the extent of a guarantor's independent obligation
will be determined based on the terms of the guarantor's agreement. Under Riverside
and Founders, guarantors will seemingly be allowed to waive any of their statutory
rights.
While Riverside and Founders may appear broad, these decisions are consistent
with the modem suretyship law. The most recent survey of American suretyship law,
the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty, has adopted rules recognizing
the freedom of guarantors and sureties to waive their rights. Section 6 of the
Restatement (Third) provides that all the rules governing the rights of guarantors may
be varied by the agreement of the parties. In addition, section 48 recognizes the
ability of guarantors to waive their suretyship defenses. Riverside and Founders also
seem consistent with the recent revisions to the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial
Code. Section 3-505(i) of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code clearly
establishes that an accommodation party can waive its "suretyship defenses."
B. Possible Limitations on Guarantor Waiver and Construction Issues
1. Unconscionability and Good Faith
What are the limitations on the guarantor's ability to waive its rights? The freedom
of contract given to guarantor's would, of course, be limited by general doctrines of




contract law such as good faith and unconscionability.2 7 These doctrines would
prevent any overreaching or abuse.
However, the waiver of any defense that would result in a discharge is not, in itself,
ordinarily unconscionable, and an action taken by a creditor that would result in
discharge in spite of a waiver by the guarantor is not ordinarily a breach of the duty
of good faith or fair dealing.' Unconscionability requires two elements: (1) lack of
meaningful choice (procedural unconscionability), and (2) contract terms unreasonably
favorable to the other side under the circumstances (substantive unconscionability).ra
A guarantor is not generally making the guaranty to assure a needed benefit. Thus,
the guarantor would generally have a choice in entering the contract. In addition, a
guaranty is generally required to ensure the satisfaction of a loan made to a person
with questionable credit. A waiver of suretyship rights, which only provides added
assurance that a questionable loan is satisfied, is probably not unreasonable under the
circumstances. The obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires that "neither
party, because of the purposes of the contract, will act to injure the parties' reasonable
expectations nor impair the rights or interests of the other .... ."' If a guaranty
contract expressly provides for liability even if the creditor takes a certain action, it
seems absurd to find that if the creditor takes such action, it has injured the guarantor's
"reasonable expectations" or impaired the guarantor's "rights or interests."
A waiver would thus rarely be struck down based on unconscionability or breach
of good faith and fair dealing."2 These concepts, however, would be available to
protect the guarantor from egregious situations involving fraud or oppression.
2. Gratuitous Guarantors and the "Strict Rule of Construction"
There is an issue concerning whether waivers should be treated differently when
the guaranty is made gratuitously for a friend or relative. Arguably, a guarantor in
such a situation is "a fool with a pen and thus deserving of judicial protection."'
However, the only apparent protections given to such gratuitous guarantors have been
based on a strict rule of construction concerning the obligations of the guarantor. 2 3
Oklahoma courts have held that the terms of a guaranty contract, gratuitous or
otherwise, are to be determined according to the rules of construction applicable to
any contract.' Then, after the terms of the guaranty contract have been deter-
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 6 cmt. a (1996); see also First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502,509 (Okla. 1993) (applying obligation of good
faith and fair dealing to a guaranty contract); Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Okla. 1976)
(discussing the equitable concept of unconscionability); 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-203 (1991) (obligation of
good faith imposed in all contracts).
228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 24 cmt. a (1996)
229. See Barnes, 548 P.2d at 1020.
230. Kissee, 859 P.2d at 509.
231. For examples of courts refusing to invalidate guaranty waivers based on unconscionability, see
Barclays Business Credit, Inc. v. Freyer, No. CV 960152347S, 1997 WL 255248, *4-5 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 6, 1997); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. O'Connor, 63 A.2d 30, 32 (Me. 1995).
232. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-9, at 495 (4th
ed. 1995),
233. See Lamm & Co. v. Colcord, 98 P. 355, 356 (Okla. 1908).
234. See INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brandywine Assocs., Ld., 800 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Okla. Ct. App.
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mined, the obligations of the guarantor will be construed under the strict rule of
construction to protect the guarantor from being held beyond the express terms of the
guaranty contract." Therefore, the strict rule of construction applicable in the case
of gratuitous guarantors is not really helpful to the guarantor if the unambiguous
terms of a guaranty contract waive the guarantor's rights.
3. Construction of the Terms of the Guaranty Agreement
Questions arise concerning the rule Oklahoma courts have applied in construing
the ambiguous terms of guaranty contracts. The prevailing view is that guaranty
contracts should be construed under general contract interpretation rules.' While
Oklahoma law could be interpreted to require that guaranty contracts be construed
under general contract principles, 7 Oklahoma courts have consistently held that the
terms of a guaranty should be construed strongly against the guarantor. 8 Oklahoma
courts have applied this rule in almost every case; however, other rules of
construction could potentially be applicable in certain situations. The approach taken
by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. B.A.S., Inc."
is instructive. In Federal Deposit, the guarantor executed a guaranty on a printed
form supplied by the lending institution. The court held that "a printed contract will
be construed most strongly against the party who prepared the document and that an
uncertainty or ambiguity in a contract will be construed against the party that caused
the uncertainty or ambiguity."'  Instead of relying blindly on the line of cases
construing guaranty contracts strongly against the guarantor, the Federal Deposit
court looked at the factual situation involved to determine the proper rule of
construction. Other Oklahoma courts should follow Federal Deposit and look more
closely at the fact,; of the particular situation in determining the proper rule of
construction.
As with the strict rule of construction applied to the obligations of gratuitous
guarantors, however, the rules applied in construing the terms of a guaranty contract
do not actually affect the ability of guarantors to waive their rights. If the guarantor
has unambiguously waived its rights under the terms of the guaranty agreement, rules
of construction make no difference.
1990); see also 15 OKLk. STAT. § 374 (1991); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY
§ 14 (1996).
235. See Lamm, 93 P. at 356; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §
14 (1996) (reporter's ncte and cases quoted therein).
236. See RESTATEIMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 14 (1996).
237. See INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brandywine Assocs., Ltd., 800 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Okla. Ct. App.
1990); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 374 (1991).
238. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 507 (Okla. 1993).
239. 735 P.2d 358 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).




4. Adhesion Contract Principles
It has been argued, mostly unsuccessfully, that a guaranty contract is a "contract
of adhesion" in certain situations. 4' The Oklahoma Supreme Court provides the
following definition of an adhesion contract:
The term [adhesion contract] refers to a standardized contract prepared
by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a
contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman
and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the second party
on a "take it or leave it" basis, without opportunity for bargaining and
under such conditions that the "adherer" cannot obtain the desired
product or service save by acquiescing in the form agreement. 2
The key characteristic is that the "weaker party has no realistic choice to terms."2"
While Oklahoma courts have been reluctant to extend adhesion contract status to
a bank contract,2 ' it is possible that a guaranty could be classified as a contract of
adhesion in certain situations. Most guaranty agreements entered by banks and other
lending institutions are on printed forms for convenience. Also, it is probable that in
certain consumer transactions the guarantor must accept the terms of the guaranty in
order to get the loan for the principal, and thus has virtually no bargaining power.
However, even if the situation justified a conclusion that the guaranty could be
classified as a contract of adhesion, that classification would not affect the guarantor's
ability to waive its rights under Oklahoma law.
Adhesion contracts are not per se illegal under Oklahoma law.245 Oklahoma
courts have maintained that such contracts are helpful to commerce because they
allow standardization and equal treatment of contractees! 6 The result of finding
an adhesion contract is that ambiguous terms of the printed contract will be construed
most strongly against the drafting party.247 Thus, even if a guaranty was found to
241. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Oceanic Bank, 223 Cal. Rptr. 757, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting
argument that guaranty is an adhesion contract); Boatman's Nat'l Bank of Belleville v. Benton, 579
N.E.2d 9, 11 (111. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting argument that guaranty was a contract of adhesion because
there was no evidence of disparity in bargaining power); Columbia Bank, N.A. v. New Casadia Corp.,
682 P.2d 966, 968 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting argument that guaranty was a contract of adhesion);
see also Barbara B. Rintala, California's Anti-Deficiency Legislation and Surety Law: The Transversion
of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 UCLA L. REv. 245, 324-25 (1969) (arguing that standardized
guaranty contracts should be analyzed as adhesion contracts).
242. Rogers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Okla. 1963) (quoting Steven v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d 284, 297 (Cal. 1963)).
243. Id.
244. See id. But cf Baker v. Baker, 710 P.2d 129, 133 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing that some
courts have classified bank contracts as adhesion contracts).
245. See Towne, Hester & Erwin, Inc. v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 P.2d 594, 597
(Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
246. See id.
247. See Littlefield v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 857 P.2d 65, 69 (Okla. 1993); Towne, 947 P.2d
at 597.
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be an adhesion contract, any waivers placed on the guaranty would be valid as long
as they were unambiguous. The argument that a guaranty is an adhesion contract in
a particular situation seems only to give the guarantor the benefit of having the
guaranty construed strongly against the drafting party. A guarantor would have to
look to concepts of unconscionability or fraud to get relief from signing a standar-
dized guaranty contract.
5. Summary of Limitations on Waiver and Construction Issues
Very few limitations are placed on a guarantor's ability to waive its rights.
Because a guaranty is a contract, the guarantor will be protected from egregious
situations by such contract principles as unconscionability and good faith. In
situations involving printed forms, guarantors should get the benefit of the rule that
printed contracts should be construed strongly against the drafter; however, that rule
only protects guarantors if the contract terms are ambiguous. Thus, if a waiver clause
unambiguously waives the guarantor's basis for discharge and no facts support a
finding that the waiver is avoidable based on unconscionability or other contract
principles, then the guarantor will be held liable. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated in Founders, "even though the result may be harsh, a party will be bound by
the unambiguous terms of a contract.""4
IV. Oklahoma's Approach to the Ability of a Guarantor to Waive Discharge
Through the Application of Oklahoma Anti-Deficiency Statute
Under Apache, a guarantor may get the benefit of the anti-deficiency provisions
of section 686 through the guarantor protections of the Oklahoma guaranty statutes.
Thus, while guarantors may not get the direct protection of section 686, guarantors
will get the indirect protection of section 686 through the application of the
Oklahoma guaranty statutes. However, Riverside and Founders clearly indicate that
any protection that a guarantor might receive under section 686 can be waived in the
guaranty agreement.
While Oklahoma decisions and prevailing law make it clear that guarantors should
be allowed to freely waive their suretyship rights, there is an issue of whether the
guarantors shbuld be allowed to waive anti-deficiency protections. Strong policy
considerations led to enactment of anti-deficiency statutes. The following analysis
considers whether the policy considerations behind the anti-deficiency provisions of
section 686 are impaired by allowing guarantors to waive their protections. In
addition, this part of the comment considers whether there should be limitations on
waiver of anti-deficiency protection when the Oklahoma power of sale statute is
applicable or when the party secondarily liable is an accommodation party or surety.
A. Comparison of Oklahoma's Approach with Other Jurisdictions
The determination of whether a guarantor can waive any protections that result
from the application of an anti-deficiency statute apparently turns upon whether the




guarantor comes under the direct protection of the anti-deficiency provisions. Thus,
the issue of guarantor waiver is determined based on statutory language and, if the
anti-deficiency statute is ambiguous, on the court's view of the public policy behind
the statute.
Courts that have allowed the guarantor to waive any protection from anti-
deficiency statutes have followed an approach similar to the Oklahoma courts.249
These courts have generally held that the guarantor did not fall under the protection
of the anti-deficiency statute based on the statute's language." Those courts would
then look to the guaranty agreement and the law of suretyship to determine the
guarantor's obligation."' If the guaranty agreement contained language waiving any
applicable suretyship defenses, the courts have had no problem upholding the waiver
and finding the guarantor liable on its guaranty.' These decisions are a correct
application of suretyship principles.
In the other line of cases, the courts have found that guarantors were directly
protected by the application of the anti-deficiency statutes. Some states' legislatures
have specifically provided that guarantors come under the protection of the
statute 3 Accordingly, some courts have held that the guarantor was protected
where the anti-deficiency statute protected persons "indirectly or contingently
liable."' However, even where the anti-deficiency statute has not specifically
applied to guarantors, some courts have construed the statute to apply directly to
guarantors. 5
These decisions finding direct guarantor protection under ambiguous statutes are
derived from two rationales. First, some cases place the guarantors under the direct
protection of the anti-deficiency statute under the rationale that the guaranty is
essentially the same debt as the mortgage debt.' While these courts recognize that
a guaranty is a separate contract, they reason that the guarantor is liable on basically
the same "obligation" as the mortgage debtor." Second, at least one case placed
249. See, e.g., Victory Highway Village, Inc. v. Weaver, 634 F.2d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 1980);
Mariners Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Neil, 99 Cal. Rptr. 238, 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Union Bank v.
Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); Valley Bank v. Larson, 663 P.2d 653, 655 (Idaho
1983); National City Bank v. Lundgren, 453 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. 1989); Bank of Kirkwood Plaza
v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640, 645 (N.D. 1980).
250. See, e.g., Lundgren, 453 N.W.2d at 591-92; Mueller, 294 N.W.2d at 645; Valley Bank, 663
P.2d at 655.
251. See, e.g., Lundgren, 453 N.W.2d at 592; Mueller, 294 N.W.2d at 643-44.
252. See cases cited supra note 243.
253. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (Michie 1997); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814 (West
1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8103 (West 1982).
254. See Klinke v. Samuels, 190 N.E. 324, 326 (N.Y. 1934).
255. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank of Ariz., N.A. v. Tatum & Bell Ctr. Ass'n, 821 P.2d 1384, 1387-
88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Crowell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 347-48 (Nev. 1986);
First Interstate Bank of Nev. v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429,431-32 (Nev. 1986); Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith,
892 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1995); King County Say. Bank v. Fulton Say. Bank Kings County, 52 N.Y.S.2d 47,
49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Syracuse v. Wagner, 402 N.Y.S.2d 936,
939-40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
256. See Surety Life, 892 P.2d at 3; Kings County, 52 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
257. See Surety Life, 892 P.2d at 3; Kings County, 52 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
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guarantors under the protection of the anti-deficiency statute based on public policy.
In First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, 8 the court looked at the public
policy behind the Nevada statute which provided for the mortgage debtor to get a
credit for the fair market value of the property sold at foreclosure. The Shields court
reasoned that the rationale for the statute was to prevent the creditor from realizing
an amount greater than the debt due by purchasing the property at the foreclosure
sale at less than market value and seeking an inflated deficiency. 9 In such a case,
the creditor would receive a windfall in the amount of the difference in the bid price
and the fair market value of the property it acquired.' The Shields court concluded
that the legislative policy behind the anti-deficiency statute would be circumvented
by denying guarantors the protection of the set-off for fair market value.26
While few have addressed the issue, the courts in jurisdictions finding that
guarantors fall under the direct protection of the anti-deficiency statute have held that
guarantors could not waive the anti-deficiency protectionsm Thus, the language
and public policy rationale of section 686 should be considered to determine whether
its anti-deficiency provisions should directly protect guarantors.
B. Analysis of the Language and Policy of the Anti-Deficiency Protections of
Section 686
None of the Oklahoma decisions considering guarantor rights has discussed the
language of section 686 or its public policy rationale. The following analysis
considers the language and public policy rationale of the anti-deficiency provisions
of section 686 to determine whether guarantors should get absolute protection.
1. Time Limitation for Seeking a Deficiency
Section 686 contains the following language which establishes the ninety-day
limitation on seeking a deficiency judgment:
[N]o judgment shall be enforced for any residue of the debt remaining
unsatisfied as prescribed by this act after the mortgaged property shall be
sold, except as herein provided. Simultaneously with the making of a
motion for awi order confirming the sale of in any event within ninety
(90) days after the date of the sale, the party to whom such residue shall
be owing may make a motion in the action for leave to enter a deficien-
cy judgment upon notice to the party against whom such judgment is
258. 730 P.2d 429 (Nev. 1986).
259. See id. at 431.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Sierra, 641 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996); cf. Crowell, 731 P.2d at 248 (holding that a clause stating that "the cessation of liability of the
maker, or any other person (for any reason other thanfull payment) ... shall not affect in any way the
liability of the undersigned under his guaranty" was not sufficient to waive the guarantor's right to set-off




sought or the attorney who shall have appeared for such party in such
action.m3
The key issue concerning the ninety-day limitation questions whether an action
against a guarantor is for the "residue of the debt remaining unsatisfied." Courts are
split on whether a guarantor is obligated for the "debt" or "obligation" of the
mortgage debtor. Some courts hold that the obligation of the guarantor is completely
separate from the "debt" or "obligation" of the mortgage debtor and thus conclude
that the anti-deficiency statute is not applicable to the guarantor's obligation.' New
York courts, however, hold that guarantors are directly protected under a statute
which applies to "a person who is liable.., for the payment of the debt secured by
the mortgage."' In addition, courts holding that guarantors are protected under
anti-deficiency statutes have placed special emphasis on the fact that the statute
applied to actions "for the balance due" on the mortgage debt.' Therefore,
analyzing these decisions construing similar language, the language "residue of the
debt remaining unsatisfied" is unclear at best.
The view that actions against guarantors are not actions to recover on the "debt"
or obligation of the mortgage debtor provides a better approach that is most
consistent with Oklahoma law. First, Oklahoma courts have consistently held that
guarantees are obligations separate and distinct from the obligations of the principal
debtor. 7 Second, in 1986, the Oklahoma Legislature passed additional anti-
deficiency provisions in the statute giving mortgagees the ability to use a power of
sale.' These anti-deficiency protections refer specifically to "mortgagors." This
statute was passed after the Riverside decision. Thus, if the legislature wanted to
ensure that guarantors got the direct protection of anti-deficiency provisions, the
legislature could have explicitly done so in the power of sale statute.' In addition,
it would seem inconsistent to construe the ninety-day limitation of section 686 to
apply directly to guarantors while the same provision of the power of sale statute did
not apply to guarantors. Third, the courts which find that guarantors should be
protected under language similar to that found in section 686 strain the ambiguous
language of the statute. While the language of section 686 could be stretched to
apply to guarantors, the language of the paragraph containing the ninety-day
limitation, read as a whole, is focused on the foreclosure action against the mortgage
debtor and does not deal with the collateral obligation of guarantors.
263. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 686 (1991).
264. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nal Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hunter, 67 P.2d 99, 102 (Cal. 1937); Valley
Bank v. Larson, 663 P.2d 653, 655 (Idaho 1983); Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640,
643 (N.D. 1980).
265. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 1371(1) (McKinney 1979); see Merchants NatI Bank & Trust Co.
of Syracuse v. Wagner, 402 N.Y.S.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
266. See First Interstate Bank of Ariz. v. Tatum & Bell Center Ass'n, 821 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991); Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1995).
267. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 & n.13 (Okla. 1980).
268. See 46 OKLA. STAT. § 43 (1991).
269. Cf. National City Bank of Minneapolis v. Lundgren, 435 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
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Like the language of section 686, the public policy behind the ninety-day limitation
does not likely support a finding that the statute should directly apply to guarantors.
New York courts have stated that the requirement that a motion be made in the
foreclosure action within ninety days after the sale was designed to give the
mortgagor "an oppcrtunity to contest entry of a deficiency judgment" ' and to give
"the court [an] opportunity to satisfy itself as to the fairness of the.., foreclosure
sale and to determine the proper amount of deficiency, if any." ' Further, those
courts provide that the protections of the ninety-day limitation were designed to
"relieve the defaulting mortgagor from an unjust deficiency judgment."2"' The
ninety-day limitation on the motion virtually ensures that the mortgagee acts promptly
and does not drag out the determination of the deficiency against the mortgagor who
has just had its property foreclosed. No strong argument can be made that this
rationale should be extended directly to guarantors. This rationale focuses on the
protection of the mortgagor who has just had its property sold at foreclosure.
Therefore, because of the unclear language of section 686 and the lack of any
strong public policy justification applicable to guarantors, the ninety-day limitation
of section 686 should not apply directly to guarantors. Therefore, the Riverside
court's determination that the ninety-day provision only dealt with the debtor/creditor
relationship seems supported by the language and policy behind section 686. The
Riverside court properly focused on the guaranty agreement and the Oklahoma
guaranty statutes in determining the guarantor's liability. Allowing guarantors to
waive any indirect protection because of the mortgagee's failure to seek a deficiency
judgment will not significantly undermine the public policy behind the ninety-day
limitation. In sum, neither the language nor public policy of the ninety-day limitation
of section 686 provides a basis for limiting the guarantor's freedom of contract.
2. Fair Market Value Set-off
Sound arguments support the conclusion that guarantors should get the direct
protection of the set-off for fair market value of the mortgage property under section
686. The language allowing for set-off states:
In any action . . . .other than an action to foreclose a mortgage, to
recover a judgment for any indebtedness secured by a mortgage on real
property and which originated simultaneously with such mortgage and
which is secured solely by such mortgage, against any person or cor-
poration directly or indirectly or contingently liable therefor [shall be
entitled to set-off the fair market value of the mortgaged property].
273
270. Berkman v. Silverstein, 282 N.Y.S. 375, 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935).
271. Merchants, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
272. Berkman, 282 N.Y.S. at 376.




In Klinke v. Samuels,74 the Court of Appeals of New York held that language
identical to the set-off provision of section 686 was applicable to guarantors.2 7 5 The
court focused on the fact that the statute contained language referring to persons
"indirectly or contingently liable." The court reasoned that this language would be
rendered worthless if the statute were not interpreted to apply to guarantors 6
Notably, Klinke was decided in 1934 and the Oklahoma legislature amended section
686 to include the set-off language from the New York statute in 1941. r Thus, the
Oklahoma Legislature was likely aware of how the set-off language had been
interpreted when they put it in section 686.
In addition, strong public policy arguments suggest that guarantors should be
protected by the set-off for fair market value. It seems universally accepted that the
fair value set-off is designed to prevent a mortgagee from getting a windfall by
purchasing the property at less than market value at foreclosure, selling it at its fair
market value, and then seeking an inflated deficiency from the mortgagor.27 If the
protection of the set-off is not extended to guarantors, the creditor will potentially
still be able to get an excess recovery, but at the expense of the guarantor instead of
the mortgagor.'
While the language of section 686 and the public policy behind the market value
set-off are persuasive, other arguments suggest that guarantors should not fit under
the language of the set-off provisions of section 686. First, the paragraph is limited
to actions for "any indebtedness secured by a mortgage." The collateral obligation
of the guarantor is not "secured" by the mortgage on the principal's property. The
guarantor's obligation to the creditor is additional security for the principal
obligation.2" Second, as stated above, in 1986 the Oklahoma Legislature passed a
power of sale statute which included additional anti-deficiency protections?' The
set-off provision of the power of sale statute clearly applies only to "mortgagors.""
Thus, this later expression of legislative intent shows that the Oklahoma Legislature
does not intend to give guarantors direct anti-deficiency protection.
Additionally, some argue that public policy should not require that the market
value set-off be extended to guarantors. First, the public policy rationale should not
274. 190 N.E. 324 (N.Y. 1934).
275. See id. at 326.
276. See id
277. See Ingerton v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, 291 F.2d 662, 665 (10th Cir. 1961)
(recognizing that the 1941 amendments to section 686 were based on the New York statue governing
deficiency judgements).
278. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank of Nev. v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429, 431 (Nev. 1986); First
Interstate Bank of Ariz. v. Tatum & Bell Ct'. Assocs., 821 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991);
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 8.3, at 588.
279. See Shields, 730 P.2d at 431.
280. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hunter, 67 P.2d 99, 102 (Cal. 1937); Heckes
v. Sapp, 40 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Valley Bank v. Larson, 663 P.2d 653, 655 (Idaho
1983); Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640, 643 (N.D. 1980).
281. See Heckes, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
282. See 46 OKLA. STAT. § 43(A)(2) (1991).
283. See id. § 43(A)(2)(d).
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apply in situations where the creditor did not purchase the property at foreclosure.
In that case, if the protection of the set-off is given to the guarantor, the creditor has
no chance to get full satisfaction for the mortgage debt. Second, the guarantor has
means to protect itself. The guarantor can contest the confirmation of the sale if the
price is grossly inadequate or the result is inequitable a Also, the guarantor could
participate in the foreclosure to ensure the property is purchased at a reasonable
price. If the guarantor had to purchase the property at foreclosure at a price less than
fair market value, the guarantor would theoretically be in the same position as it
would be if it had the benefit of the set-off for fair market value. Third, if
creditors could not use guarantees to protect themselves from the difference between
the foreclosure sale price and fair market price, they would be forced to purchase the
property at foreclosure in order to have the best chance to receive full satisfaction.
A third-party purchaser will probably never pay full market price for property sold
at foreclosure, and thus, if the property is sold to a third party, the creditor would
have no ability to rezover for the difference between sale price and the fair market
value determined by the court. If guarantors are not allowed to waive the set-off, the
creditor is forced to purchase the property and hope to sell it for fair market value
in order to get full satisfaction of the debt. Fourth, a court's determination of "fair
market value" of tha mortgage property may not correspond with the economic
reality of its value. Thus, the "windfall" the creditor receives may be more fiction
than reality.
While there are strong arguments that the language of the set-off provision of
section 686 should apply to guarantors, Oklahoma's approach of allowing guarantors
to waive any protection that section 686 might provide remains sound. In the absence
of a waiver, Oklahoma courts will likely give guarantors the benefit of the set-off
under section 686, either directly or through the application of the Oklahoma
guaranty statutes.' However, allowing guarantors to waive any protection they
might receive seems a reasonable result. While potential for abuse by the creditor
would exist, the guarantor would have the means to protect itself. Also, allowing
waiver will enable creditors to get full satisfaction even if they did not purchase the
property at foreclosure. The Oklahoma approach - giving guarantors the benefit of
the set-off unless they contract to waive that benefit - seems a good compromise of
the public policy behind the set-off protections of section 686.
284. See Founders Bank & Trust Co. v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1364 n.33 (Okla. 1992).
285. Assume that the creditor seeks a timely deficiency judgement and thus preserves the
subrogation rights of the guarantor against the principal. Also assume: (1) the debt was $100; (2) the
court correctly determined the fair market value of the property was $80; and (3) the guarantor purchased
the property at foreclosure for $60. Assuming no right to set-off, the guarantor would have had to pay
the creditor $40 to satisfy the deficiency. The guarantor would not be hurt in this situation. It paid out
a total of $100 ($60 + $40), and it would be able to collect $20 from the principal based on the right of
subrogation and could recover the remaining $80 by selling the property at fair market value.




C. Will Allowing Guarantor Waiver Deny Mortgage Debtors the Protection of
Section 686?
Some courts have argued that guarantors should get the protections of anti-
deficiency protections because the debtor would be deprived of the benefit of the
statute based on the guarantor's right to reimbursement.' However, Oklahoma
courts would probably not allow that result if a guarantor waived the benefits of
section 686. The courts in Apache and Riverside stated that a guarantor would not
likely have any recourse against the principal if the guarantor were required to satisfy
a deficiency barred by section 686 As discussed above, 9 under principles of
reimbursement, a guarantor who waives a defense available to the principal should
not be entitled to reimbursement.2 First, public policy precludes requiring the
principal to reimburse the principal because that requirement would deprive the
principal of the benefits of section 686. Second, it is not inequitable to make the
guarantor bear the loss caused by the anti-deficiency statute because the guarantor
assumed the risk of that loss by waiving its defenses.
D. Analogy to Guarantor Waiver of Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial
Code
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code contains provisions that are analogous
to the anti-deficiency protections given to mortgage debtors. Once a secured party
has taken possession of collateral upon default, section 9-504(3) of the Uniform
Commercial Code requires that a secured party give reasonable notification of the
sale of collateral to the "debtor" and also requires that a secured party sell or dispose
of the collateral in a manner that is "commercially reasonable."291 If these re-
quirements are not met, the creditor's deficiency judgment may be lost.' g Section
9-501(3)(b) provides that "debtors" cannot waive the protections of section 9-504(3).
The majority of courts have held that a guarantor is a "debtor" for the purposes of
the notice and commercial reasonableness requirements of section 9-504(3)."
However, a substantial split exists among the courts concerning whether a guarantor,
unlike the principal debtor on the secured obligation, can waive the requirements of
notice and commercial reasonableness.
287. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank of Nev. v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429, 432 (Nev. 1986); Kocsorak
v. Cleveland Trust Co., 85 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ohio 1949).
288. See Riverside Nat'I Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1980); Apache Lanes, Inc.,
v. Nat'l Educators Life Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 984, 986 (Okla. 1975).
289. See discussion supra Part II.D.
290. See First NatI Park Bank v. Johnson, 553 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1977); Mutual Fin. Co. v.
Politzer, 256 N.E.2d 606, 611 (Ohio 1970); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §
24(I)(c) & cmt. b (1996).
291. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 9-504(3) (1991).
292. See generally 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 26 (West 1998); WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 232, § 25-11.
293. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 890 F.2d 220, 222 (10th Cir. 1989); Gambo v. Bank of
Maryland, 648 A.2d 1105, 1108 & n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). But see First NatI Park Bank v.
Kelley, 553 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1977).
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The decisions allowing guarantors to waive the protections of section 9-504(3)
support the Oklahoma decisions allowing guarantors to waive the anti-deficiency
protections of section 686. Courts have reasoned that guarantors should be allowed
to waive to facilitate the extension of credit.' Also, courts have determined that
the guarantor's freedom of contract should be protected. 95 In addition, courts have
noted that the obligation of a guarantor is collateral to the obligations of the principal
debtor.
While some court; have relied solely on the Uniform Commercial Code definition
of a "debtor,"' other courts holding that guarantors should not be allowed to waive
the protections of section 9-504(3) have considered public policy reasons for the
protections. These courts have made two arguments. First, the courts have focused
on the fact that allowing guarantors to waive would encourage the "economic waste
which the Code was designed to minimize." '  Allowing waiver would negate the
duties placed on secured parties concerning the disposal of collateral by enabling the
secured party to collect any deficiency from the guarantor even when the secured
party has grossly neglected its statutory duties in disposing of the collateral.'
Second, the courts have reasoned that upon default the guarantor is the real target of
the creditor and it would be inequitable to allow the secured party to deprive the
guarantor of the benefit of a reasonable return on the collateral.'n
The rationale used by courts finding that guarantors should not be able to waive
the protection of section 9-504(3) is distinguishable from the rationale behind
Oklahoma anti-deficiency protections. The focus of the courts addressing section 9-
504(3) is that the secured party will abuse the debtor by disposing of the collateral
in a way that deprives the guarantor of the full value of the collateral. The purpose
of the requirements of section 9-504(3) is ensuring that the secured party will get a
fair price for the collateral.
In the case of section 686, however, the same public policy concerns do not seem
to be at stake. The anti-deficiency protections extend beyond ensuring that the sale
of the collateral will be sold at a fair value. Both the court and the foreclosure
procedures ensure that the mortgage property is sold in a reasonable manner. The
focus of the anti-deficiency statutes is to protect the mortgagor from burdensome
deficiency judgments, even when the property was sold in a reasonable manner. The
anti-deficiency statutes focus on the fact that even if a sale of mortgage property is
294. See Steinberg v. Cinema N' Drafthouse Sys., Inc., 28 F.3d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1994); United
States v. H & S Realty Co., 837 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Curley, 753 F. Supp.
611, 616 (E.D. Va. 1990).
295. See Chrysler, 753 F. Supp. at 616; see also Steinberg, 28 F.3d at 26 (reasoning that the
guarantor should be allowed to access his own interests).
296. See H & S Realty, 837 F.2d at 3 (reasoning that a guarantor is "once removed" from the
position of the principal debtor).
297. See e.g., Branan v. Equico Lessors, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 671, 672 (Ga. 1986).
298. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
299. See United Stat.cs v. Kelley, 890 F.2d 220,223 (10th Cir. 1989); Gambo v. Bank of Maryland,
648 A.2d 1105, 1113 (M.I. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).




conducted properly, the price received may not reflect the true value of the property
and mortgage debtors should be protected from that burden. Therefore, the rationale
of courts refusing to allow guarantors the protections of section 9-504(3) of the
Uniform Commercial Code does not compel a conclusion that guarantors should be
prevented from waiving the protections of anti-deficiency statutes.
E. Sham Guarantor Defense
Courts have held that "guarantors" were not allowed to waive the protections of
an anti-deficiency statute when, in substance, the guarantor is the principal debtor?'"
The courts reasoned that creditors should not be allowed to subvert the purpose of
anti-deficiency statutes by placing the principal debtor in the position of a surety.'
The test applied by the courts is whether "the supposed guarantors [are] nothing more
than principal obligors under another name."3 3 Courts have applied the "sham
guaranty" defense in situations where the "debtor" was a partnership, corporation, or
trust."° This doctrine is soundly designed to prevent abuse and should be a valid
defense to waiver of the anti-deficiency protections of section 686.
F. Guarantor Waiver of Anti-Deficiency Protections of Oklahoma Power of Sale
Statute
The anti-deficiency protections included in Oklahoma's power of sale statute"
raise no novel issues. The legislature clearly intended that guarantors would not be
directly protected by the anti-deficiency provisions of section 43(A)(2). For example,
the legislature consistently used the term "mortgagor" in the language establishing the
anti-deficiency protections.' Therefore, under Apache and Riverside, the Oklahoma
guaranty statutes and the guaranty agreement will determine the obligations of a
guarantor after the application of the anti-deficiency protections of section 43.'
G. Waiver of the Anti-Deficiency Protections to Sureties and Accommodation
Parties
Parties often become secondarily liable on a mortgage debt as an accommodation
party or as a surety by operation of law upon the transfer of the mortgaged property.
However, no Oklahoma courts have addressed the rights of accommodation parties
and sureties under the anti-deficiency protections of section 686. The language of
301. See, e.g., River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 790, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Union
Bank v. Dorn, 61 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 735, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 8.3, at 593.
302. See River Bank, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
303. Id. at 802.
304. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 8.3, at 593.
305. 46 OKLA. STAT. § 43(A)(2)(c)-(d) (1991).
306. See Miller & Schroeder, Inc. v. Gearman, 413 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that a statute which consistently used the term "mortgagor" clearly does not apply to
guarantors).
307. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1980); Apache Lanes, Inc.,
v. Nat'l Educators Life Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 984, 986 (Okla. 1975).
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section 686 and the distinctions between guarantors and sureties or accommodation
parties raise issues concerning whether they should be able to waive the protections
provided by section 6586.
Accommodation parties are liable as sureties, but are also liable in the capacity in
which they sign the instrument.03 Apparently, an accommodation party's duties are
determined based on the capacity in which it signs, but as an accommodation party
it is given additional rights. Thus, an accommodation party who signs as a maker is
liable on the note. Therefore, while a guarantor is only obligated based on its
separate guaranty agreement, an accommodation party who signs as a maker is jointly
and severally liable on the note establishing the principal indebtedness." Thus, it
seems that an accommodation party who was a maker could fit within the language
of section 686. The anti-deficiency provisions of section 686 apply to actions for the
"residue of the debt remaining unsatisfied" and to actions on "any indebtedness
secured by a mortgage on real property.""3 ' Arguably, if the accommodation party
was a maker on the note secured by the mortgage, then the party would fit under the
language of section 686. If the accommodation party was directly protected by
section 686, it may not be allowed to waive the protections of the statute.
On the other hand, Oklahoma courts have held that section 686 only applies to the
debtor/creditor relationship and does not apply to the debtor/creditor/guarantor
relationship."' Thus, an Oklahoma court could look to the substance of the
accommodation party's status as essentially a guarantor and determine that it should
not come under the protection of section 686. A court would be placing form over
substance if the determination of whether a party came under the protections of
section 686 turned oi whether the party had signed the note or a separate guaranty
agreement. Importantly, courts have held that indorsers of notes secured by a
mortgage do not come under the protection of anti-deficiency statutes."'
Assuming that an accommodation party was not directly protected by section 686,
the accommodation party's rights would not likely be any different from those of a
guarantor under Oklahoma law. The discharge of the accommodated party by
operation of the ninety-day limitation for seeking a deficiency judgment does not fit
within the suretyship defenses of section 3-605. Section 3-605(b), which denies an
accommodation party discharge based on the discharge of the obligation of the
accommodated party, does not apply because it only applies to voluntary discharges
under section 3-604.313 Thus, since section 3-605 does not apply, the accom-
modation party would be able to raise any defenses of the accommodated party under
section 3-305(d).3"4 Therefore, the accommodation party would get a discharge
because of the discharge of the accommodated party. In addition, waiver of the
accommodation party's rights under section 3-305(d) is not governed by section 3-
308. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-419(b) (1991).
309. See Beneficial Fin. Co. of Norman v. Marshall, 551 P.2d 315, 317 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
310. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 686 (1991).
311. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1980).
312. See, e.g., Lange v. Aver, 50 Cal. Rptr. 847, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
313. See also 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3-605 Okla. cmt. 21 (West 1998).




605(i). 15 Thus, the accommodation party's ability to waive would be determined
according to other state law under section 1-103. Therefore, under Riverside, the
accommodation party would be entitled to waive any right to discharge through the
application of section 686. The analysis concerning the right to set-off under section
686 would be similar because the set-off would not come under the suretyship
defenses of section 3-605 and thus would be governed by section 3-305(d).
Issues also exist concerning whether a surety by operation of law would be entitled
to the direct protection of section 686. In the situation of the mortgagor who
becomes a surety out of the transfer of the mortgaged property to a party who either
assumes or takes the property subject to the mortgage, a suretyship relationship arises
between the mortgagor and the transferee?1 6 However, as to the mortgagee, the
mortgagor is still primarily liable unless the mortgagee agrees to look to the
mortgagor only as a surety?'7 Thus, it seems that the mortgagor/surety would fit
within the protections of section 686. After transferring the property and taking on
the status as a surety, the mortgagor is still clearly liable on the "debt" or "indebte-
dness" secured by the mortgage."8 Also, a finding that the mortgagor/surety fits
within the protection of section 686 is consistent with the rationale of.the Riverside
court. The Riverside court's primary rationale was that the guarantor's obligation was
separate from the obligation of the principal." 9 In the case of a mortgagor/surety,
the mortgagor is the primary obligor in relation to the mortgagee?' Thus, a
mortgagor/surety would not be allowed to waive the protection of section 686
because it would be directly protected by the section's anti-deficiency provisions.
However, an argument could be made that if the mortgagee consented to only look
to the mortgagor as a surety, the mortgagor would then not be protected by section
686 because the mortgagor would only be secondarily liable as a surety at that point.
The determination of whether the mortgagor/surety should get the protection of
section 686, however, should not be made based on the unilateral actions of the
mortgagee.
Even if a court determined that the mortgagor/surety did not get the direct
protection of section 686, the mortgagor/surety would have the same rights as a
guarantor under title 15, sections 377-378. Thus, under Apache, Riverside, and
Founders, the mortgagor/surety would get the indirect protection of the anti-
deficiency provisions of section 686 unless it had waived the protections of the
guaranty and surety statutes. Few courts have addressed the application of anti-
deficiency statutes to suretyships created by the transfer of mortgaged property.32
This may be because such a surety seems to fit within the protections of anti-
deficiency statutes.
315. See also id. § 3-605 Oklahoma cmt. 31.
316. See Stalcup v. Easterly, 351 P.2d 735, 738 (Okla. 1960).
317. See Rice v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 45 P.2d 49, 51 (Okla. 1935).
318. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 686 (1991).
319. See Riverside Natl Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 440-41 (Okla. 1980).
320. See Rice, 45 P.2d at 51.
321. See, e.g., Kocsorak v. Cleveland Trust Co., 85 N.E.2d 96 (Ohio 1949).
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In sum, sureties and accommodation parties would at least be treated the same as
guarantors in relation to the anti-deficiency protections of section 686. However,
there are arguments that an accommodation party who signs an instrument as a maker
would not be able to waive the protections of section 686 because the accom-
modation maker would get the direct protection of section 686. In addition, a
mortgagor who becomes a surety based on the transfer of the mortgaged property
would be directly protected by section 686 and thus would not be able to waive the
anti-deficiency protections of that section.
Conclusion
Oklahoma courts have a strong policy in favor of allowing guarantors to waive
-their rights. This policy of allowing guarantor waiver seems consistent with modern
suretyship and guaranty law. Allowing guarantors to freely waive their rights
promotes freedom of contract and allows creditors, debtors, and guarantors to
structure transactions which benefit all the parties.
An important issue concerning the guaranty of mortgage debts is the effect of the
anti-deficiency protections of section 686 on the guarantor's liability. Oklahoma
courts have taken an approach to the guarantor's rights in relation to section 686
which seems to be a good compromise of the rights of creditors and guarantors.
Oklahoma courts have held that the rights of guarantors will be determined based on
the guaranty agreement and the Oklahoma guaranty statutes. Thus, if a mortgage
debtor is discharged by the application of the anti-deficiency provisions of section
686, the guarantor will be discharged through its rights under the Oklahoma guaranty
statutes. However, Oklahoma courts have held that the guarantors can waive their
statutory rights by contract. Thus, with the inclusion of carefully drafted waiver
provisions in the guaranty contract, the guarantor will be liable despite the discharge
of the mortgage debtor under section 686. This approach gives guarantors some
protection from the effects of section 686 on the mortgage debtors liability while
giving the parties flexibility in structuring mortgage transactions.
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